Essays on the determinants of educational achievements. by Lekuona Agirretxe, Agurtzane
Facultad de Economı´a y Empresa
Departamento de Fundamentos del Ana´lisis Econo´mico II
Essays on the determinants of
educational achievements
Agurtzane Lekuona Agirretxe
PhD Thesis
Supervisors: Casilda Lasso de la Vega Mart´ınez
and
Susan Orbe Mandaluniz
Bilbao, 2019
(c)2019 AGURTZANE LEKUONA AGIRRETXE
	
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to thank my thesis supervisors, Casilda Lasso de la Vega
and Susan Orbe. I thank Casilda, among many things, for encouraging me to take the
first steps into the world of research, and for being by my side at each step of the way.
I thank Susan for accepting the invitation to join us in this process and for providing
me with her guidance and support in econometrics and many other aspects. I am very
grateful that they have devoted their precious time to this dissertation in order to provide
excellence guidance, carefully correct my work, make essential contributions, and motivate
me during the hard times. It is a huge honor to have been guided by such great experts,
and I can say that they have enhanced not only my academic but also my personal growth.
I am also grateful to the members of the departments of Economı´a Aplicada IV and
Fundamentos del Ana´lisis Econo´mico II for giving me the opportunity to start my career
as a researcher. Many thanks to Karmele Agirrezabala and Ine´s Garc´ıa for their adminis-
trative support and kindness as well as to Carol Anderson for her corrections and advices
in English. Very special gratitude also goes out to the Project IT-56813 of the Basque
Government for providing the funding for this dissertation.
I would also like to thank Mar´ıa Marta Formichella and Natalia Kru¨ger for giving me
the opportunity to work with them on the fourth chapter at the Universidad Nacional del
Sur in Bah´ıa Blanca. It has been a pleasure to work with both of them while drinking
the Argentinian Mate.
My sincere thanks also go to Vito Peragine who provided me with the opportunity to
stay at the university of Bari Aldo Moro and who guided me during the stay.
I should also like to thank the participants of the 6th ECINEQ meeting held in Lux-
embourg, the 12th and 14th meetings of SSCW held in Boston and Seoul, respectively,
and the 11th IT winter school held in Canazei, for all their constructive comments, which
certainly helped to improve the chapters of this thesis.
I
To the zuleras and zuleros my heartfelt thanks for their essential companionship
through this long journey. By sharing our sorrows and joys, worries and hopes, this
path has been statistically significantly more enjoyable. They are, without doubt, the
most valuable gift of this dissertation.
My thanks also go to my collegues in Oiartzun council whose values, support and
encouragement have been of great help. It is an honor to be part of this team.
Without Aingeru’s help it would have been hard to finish my PhD. Many thanks for
listening carefully to me, providing me with the tools to understand and respect myself,
and making me aware of the importance of consciously living the ‘here and now’.
Huge thanks to Eider and Andrea for the talks in the kitchen, the “Friends” moments
in the living room, their thousands of comforting hugs and their craziness. Thanks for
understanding each other without the need for words.
I am also grateful to Karmele and Angel, and Olatz and Xanet, for showing their
interest in this thesis and constantly worrying about me. To Oihane and Jon for making
me feel happy with their purity and spontaneity, and for reminding me of the real meaning
of life.
I do not have enough words to thank my dad and mom. Thanks for always being by
my side, as well as for respecting and supporting each step I have ever taken. You are
certainly the best parents I could have had.
Last but not least, thank you Aritz for your infinite patience and love. Since the day
we first met, you have stayed with me during good times and bad. When I was too tired
to continue, you gave your hand in order that I could go ahead, always with a smile on
your face. However, I know that even if you have attempted to cover it up, you have
suffered with me. So, each achievement I have obtained during this journey is also yours.
Thank you.
II
Eskerrak
Lehenik eta behin Casilda eskertu nahiko nuke, ikerketaren munduan murgiltzera animatu
ninduelako, eta aldi berean, nire tesiaren zuzendari izatea eskaini zidalako; lehen egunetik
gaur arte eman ditudan pauso guztietan nire aldamenean izan dut. Bestetik, Susan eskertu
nahiko nuke tesi honetara batzea onartu zuelako eta ordutik ekonometrian nahiz beste
hainbat gaietan pazientzia handiz gidatu nauelako. Asko eskertzen dut hain preziatua den
beraien denbora niri eskaini izana, nire lana halako prezisioz eta dedikazioz zuzentzeko,
tesiarentzat hain baliagarriak izan diren ekarpenak egiteko, irakurgaiak proposatzeko eta
zailtasun momentuetan galduta sentitu naizenetan berriz argia ikusten laguntzeko. Urte
guzti hauetan arlo akademikoan nahiz pertsonalean garatzen lagundu didate.
Eskerrak eman nahi dizkiet Mar´ıa Marta Formichellari eta Natalia Kru¨egerri ere, Ar-
gentinan beraiekin ikertzeko aukera eskaintzeagatik. Hezkuntza arloko datuak aztertzeko
egokiak diren ereduetan sakontzeko aukera izan nuen berauei esker. Argentinan hain
ohikoa den matea edanaz beraien konpainian ikertzea plazer hutsa izan zen.
Bestalde, Vito Peragineri ere eskerrak eman nahi dizkiot Bariko unibertsitatean hil-
abeteko egonaldia egiteko aukera emateagatik. Arlo ez-parametrikoan lehen hastapenak
egiteko literatura zabala gomendatzeaz gain ikerketa ildo ezberdinak iradoki zizkidan.
2014ko ekainean Bostonen eta 2018ko ekainean Seulen ospatu ziren 12. Eta 14. SSCW
konferentzietan, 2015ko uztailan Luxenburgon gauzatu zen 6. ECINEQ jardunaldietan
eta 2016ko urtarrilan Canazein burutu zen 11. IT neguko eskolan parte hartu zutenei
ere eskerrak eman nahi dizkiet beraien komentarioengatik eta aholkuengatik. Zalantzarik
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Abstract
The goal of this dissertation is to analyze how students’ circumstances such as their family
background, school characteristics or peer groups, affect their educational achievements.
The dissertation consists of three main chapters.
Chapters 2 and 3 aim at measuring inequality of opportunity in educational achieve-
ments in twenty European countries taking data from PISA 2012. We assume that stu-
dents’ attainments are determined by circumstance and effort variables, and we construct
counterfactual distributions in which the inequality in achievements is only due to the
differences in circumstances. Inequality of opportunity is measured as the inequality of
those counterfactual distributions.
To construct the counterfactuals we follow two approaches proposed in the literature.
In Chapter 2 we follow a parametric approach where we estimate a linear regression model
for educational achievements on circumstance and effort variables, and we build counter-
factuals based on those estimates. In Chapter 3, the counterfactuals are constructed
following a non-parametric approach, where each student is assigned the average achieve-
ment of the group of students sharing either homogeneous circumstances or homogeneous
efforts.
The results obtained in Chapters 2 and 3 confirm that the two approaches are in fact
alternative methods to obtain a similar inequality of opportunity level. We find that,
among the selected countries, Belgium, France, Germany, and Bulgaria get the highest
levels for inequality of opportunity, whilst the lowest levels are for the Nordic countries.
The results also show that peer groups are the greatest contributors to the inequalities,
except for the Nordic countries, where efforts contribute more than circumstances.
Chapter 1 introduces the basic notions for the measurement of inequality of opportu-
nity and the dataset that is used in Chapters 2 and 3.
Finally, Chapter 4 analyzes the influence of circumstances not only on students’
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achievements, but also on their attitude towards school. The aim is to contribute to the
literature by analyzing the determinants of students’ attitudes towards school in Spain.
We take data from the 2009 wave of PISA and carry out the estimations using a multivari-
ate multilevel approach. This methodology attempts to capture the hierarchical structure
of the data and to take into account the existing correlation between attitude and edu-
cational achievements. The results show that the greatest proportion of the variance is
explained by the students’ personal and family characteristics. The only school-related
variables that are statistically significant for attitude towards school are those related to
the disciplinary climate. As a matter of fact, while achievements are strongly related to
the socio-economic profile of the peer group, this factor does not seem to be important in
determining their attitude.
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Introduction
This dissertation investigates to what extent students’ educational achievements are con-
ditioned by circumstances such as their family background, school characteristics and
peer effects. Understanding how these factors affect the level of outcomes is important.
Evidence indicates that individuals who get higher achievements are more likely to report
higher subjective well-being (Oreopoulos, 2007), to participate more actively in society
(Milligan et al., 2004; Dee, 2004) and to enjoy better health (Cutler et al., 2006; De
Walque, 2007; Grimard and Parent, 2007; Grossman, 2008). Thus, investigating the ex-
plicative factors of achievements is important in order to mediate the educational policy
aimed at improving students’ performance.
All the chapters of the thesis are based on the data provided by OECD’s Program for
International Student Assessment (PISA). In the last two decades, this data has high-
lighted large differences in achievements, which result from different sources. Since the de-
bate on ‘equality of what?’ pioneered by authors such as Rawls (1971); Dworkin (1981a,b);
Sen (1970); Arneson (1989) and Cohen (1989), economists have started to shift the focus
from overall inequality to inequality of opportunity. Despite the differences in the opinions
of the authors, they all agree that individuals should have equal opportunity in order to
get the desired achievements. Accordingly, once every individual has equal chances, the
outcome level an individual reaches is their own responsibility and any existing inequality
would be considered as ‘fair’. Conversely, if individuals face different opportunities, the
outcome level reached might be beyond their control and the outcome differences of this
kind are considered as ‘unfair’. Precisely, inequality of opportunity attempts to measure
the extent of that unfair inequality.
In the first economic studies on the subject, opportunity was treated directly or ex-
plicitly. In this framework every individual faces some opportunity sets. Thus, there will
be inequality of opportunity if the individuals are endowed with different sets, and some
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sets are likely to offer more advantages than others. Then, the measurement consists
of comparing situations where individuals present different opportunity sets and ranking
such situations according to the existing differences. Nevertheless, modelling opportunity
sets explicitly requires much information that is hardly ever available due to its abstract
quality. For a detailed literature review on ranking opportunities sets, see for instance
Peragine (1999) and Barbera` et al. (2004).
There is another branch of literature where unobservable opportunities are deduced
indirectly from observable factors. Here, the opportunities are represented as a set of
outcomes that individuals can reach subject to circumstances beyond their responsibility,
such as socio-economic background, as well as their own efforts. See, for instance, the
prominent models of Roemer (1993, 1998); Van de gaer (1993); Fleurbaey (1994) and
Bossert (1995). In this setting, according to Roemer (1998), an opportunity-egalitarian
policy should be focused on eliminating the consequences of circumstances, and respecting
the influence of efforts on outcomes to the greatest extent possible.
Mark Fleurbaey, Franc¸ois Maniquet and Walter Bossert also propose several opportunity-
egalitarian policies and allocation rules that are in line with the idea of Roemer’s approach
of compensating the effect of circumstances but not the influence of individual respon-
sibility. This literature is summarized in Fleurbaey (2008). Since these important con-
tributions, there has been a bloom of both theoretical and empirical literature aimed at
measuring the extent of inequality of opportunity. For instance, Pignataro (2012); Roe-
mer and Trannoy (2014); Van de gaer and Ramos (2015a); Ferreira and Peragine (2016)
provide comprehensive surveys of recent research on this topic.
Taking these aspects together, Chapter 1, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 analyze the in-
equality of opportunity in educational achievements for twenty European countries. Chap-
ter 1 provides the basis for the two following chapters. First of all, it briefly summarizes
the aspects of the measurement. In essence, we assume that students’ achievements are
determined by variables of circumstances and effort. The inequality of opportunity is
measured as the inequality of the counterfactual distributions in which the achievement
differences are uniquely due to circumstances. Next the chapter introduces the database
provided by PISA 2012 that is used in the following two chapters. For the twenty Eu-
ropean countries selected, it describes the educational outcomes represented by students’
mathematical scores, as well as the chosen explanatory variables related with students’
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family background, school characteristics, peer influences, and students’ motivation and
attitude, which represent their circumstances and efforts.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 empirically measure the inequality of opportunity, each
focusing on a different approach to construct counterfactual distributions. Chapter 2
follows a parametric approach, where we specify and estimate a linear functional form
between achievements, and circumstances and effort variables. Then, counterfactuals are
built based on those estimates.
In most studies in the field of education the inequality of opportunity hardly relies
on counterfactual distributions, instead it is mainly measured as the association between
parental background and students’ performance (see for instance, Wo¨ßmann, 2004; Schu¨tz
et al., 2007; Wo¨ßmann and Peterson, 2007; Ammermueller, 2007; Raitano and Vona,
2016). As a matter of fact, the studies that do depend on parametrically constructed
counterfactual distributions work only with certain circumstance variables (Martins and
Veiga, 2010; Ferreira and Gignoux, 2014; Salehi-Isfahani et al., 2014).
Chapter 2 contributes to the empirical measurement of inequality of opportunity in
different ways. First, we consider the proxy variables for effort in the construction of
counterfactual distributions. The selection of these proxies is based on previous studies,
such as Bozick and Depmsey (2010); de Fraja et al. (2010); Eren and Henderson (2011);
Metcalfe et al. (2011) and Kuehn and Landeras (2014) which analyze how students’ efforts
affect their achievements. As circumstances may affect achievements both directly and
through efforts, the specification that we propose captures their joint impact. Second,
we account for students’ peer effects on the side of circumstances. The rapidly grow-
ing literature finds that these effects are significant for individual student achievement
(Hanushek et al., 2003; Hoxby, 2000; McEwan, 2003; Sacerdote, 2001; Schneeweis and
Winter-Ebmer, 2007; Lavy et al., 2012; Boucher et al., 2014). In particular, if everyone
in the group is high achieving, the performance of a student is likely to be positively
affected by belonging to such a group, and simultaneously, that student might have an
impact on the groups’s average achievement. Therefore, the endogeneity of these peer
effects is taken into account when estimating the models of interest. Finally, based on
Van de gaer and Ramos (2015b), this study relies on counterfactual distributions that
behave properly regarding one basic principle of the inequality of opportunity, so that our
measures guarantee that a progressive transfer among students with the same effort will
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reduce inequality of opportunity.
In Chapter 3 the counterfactuals are constructed following two non-parametric ap-
proaches developed by Checchi and Peragine (2010). On the one hand, in the ex ante
approach students are assigned the average achievement of their type, i.e., a group of stu-
dents sharing homogeneous circumstances. In a counterfactual distribution built this way,
achievements are entirely determined by circumstances in a manner that students of the
same type obtain the same achievement regardless of the effort they exert. The inequality
of opportunity is measured as the inequality of that distribution. On the other hand, in
the ex post approach students are assigned the average achievement of their tranche, i.e.,
a group of students with homogeneous efforts. In this counterfactual distribution there
is no room for circumstances-related inequalities. Hence, the inequality of opportunity is
assessed as the distance between the actual and the counterfactual distribution.
Certainly, the definition of types and tranches condition the measures of inequality
of opportunity. Nevertheless, in practice, there is no indication of how to classify the
students into such groups. In most common procedures the students are sorted either ac-
cording to their values in a limited number of categorical circumstance or effort variables,
or according to their position in a single continuous circumstance variable. This study
seeks to provide an alternative approach to define types and tranches, regardless of the
nature and the number of variables under consideration. In particular, in both the above
specifications, circumstances and efforts correspond to the estimated vectors obtained in
the previous chapter.
The results obtained in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 confirm that Belgium, France, Ger-
many, and Bulgaria get the highest levels for inequality of opportunity, whilst the lowest
levels are for Nordic countries and for Spain and Ireland. The results also indicate, for
instance, that peer groups are the greatest contributors to the inequalities in the selected
countries, except in Nordic countries and in Spain and Ireland, countries with the lowest
between-school variance and the lowest inequality of opportunity.
Notwithstanding the importance of educational achievement, it is worth noting that
this reflects just a part of the education received at school. That is, achievements are a
way of evaluating cognitive processes which are related to the mental actions of acquir-
ing knowledge, however, they do not capture the non-cognitive skills such as students’
attitudes.
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Studies like Kautz et al. (2014); Almlund et al. (2011) and Borghans and Schils (2012)
show that non-cognitive skills play an important role in educational attaitment, labour
market success, health and criminality, among other life outcomes. Nevertheless, non-
cognitive skills have usually been neglected in the economic literature, despite their im-
portance. The aim of Chapter 4 is to make a contribution to the literature on the relevance
of non-cognitive aspects. In particular, for Spain we analyze and compare the determi-
nants of students’ achievements, or cognitive outcome, as well as their attitude towards
school, or non-cognitive outcome.
Most studies that inquire about the main determinants of the educational achievements
in Spain agree that inequality in educational achievements can be mainly attributed to
the characteristics of students and their families, the role of school and peers being in the
background (see the literature review of Ferrera et al., 2013, and the references therein).
Our findings in the previous chapters coincide with these results.
This chapter seeks to investigate whether these conclusions can be carried over to
attitudes towards school. Accordingly, the working hypothesis defends that for attitudes,
as for achievements, the main determinants are individual and family factors, whilst the
influence of the schools is relatively minor. At the same time, it presumes that among the
school variables, those related to the peer learning environment have the largest influence
on attitudes.
In order to test the hypothesis we take data from the 2009 wave of PISA for Spain and
carry out the estimations following a multivariate multilevel approach. This methodology
attempts to capture the hierarchical structure of educational data, and at the same time,
to take into account the existing correlation between attitude and educational achieve-
ments. Accordingly, a multilevel bivariate regression model is estimated in which both
the attitude towards school and the educational achievements are evaluated.
The results confirm the hypothesis and find that the greatest proportion of the variance
is explained by the students’ personal and family characteristics. In addition, the only
school-related variables that are statistically significant for attitude towards school are
those related to the prevailing disciplinary climate.
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Chapter 1
Basic notions for the measurement
of inequality of opportunity and the
PISA database
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1.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the background for the two following chapters in order to mea-
sure the educational inequality of opportunity in twenty European countries. It consists
of two main parts. On the one hand, Section 1.2 briefly summarizes the basis for the
measurement of the inequality of opportunity, by describing two basic principles that
guarantee that a measure is able to capture inequality of opportunity. On the other hand,
Section 1.3 introduces the database provided by the Program for International Student
Assessment (PISA) 2012 which is used in the two following chapters. For the twenty
European countries, this section describes the educational achievements that reflect indi-
vidual outcomes as well as the selected variables related with students’ family background,
school characteristics, peer effects, and students’ motivation and attitude, which taken
together represent their circumstances and efforts. Finally, Section 1.4 summarizes the
main conclusions.
1.2 Inequality of opportunity measurement
This section introduces the basis for the measurement of the inequality of opportunity.
We consider a population of N students and denote by Yi the educational achievement
of student i. For each student i = 1, . . . ,N, we assume that Yi is completely determined
by a vector Ci ∈ RKC of circumstances and a vector Ei ∈ RKE of efforts. We denote
by Y = [Y1, . . . , YN]
T , C = [C1, . . . ,CN] and E = [E1, . . . ,EN] the respective population
matrices of achievements, circumstances and efforts, with D being the set of all possible
population matrices, that is,
D = {(Y,C,E) : Y ∈ RN,C ∈ RN×KC ,E ∈ RN×KE}
An inequality of opportunity measure is a function M : D → R. To guarantee
that the measure M is able to capture inequality of opportunity, it should satisfy basic
principles classified as compensation or reward (see for instance Fleurbaey and Peragine,
2013; Ramos and Van de gaer, 2016).
Among the different compensation principles, this thesis focuses only on the so-called
Ex-Post Compensation (Fleurbaey and Peragine, 2013). It states that students that exert
the same effort should obtain the same achievement. Thus, the differences in the outcomes
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of the students making the same effort should be compensated.
Formally, we consider two populations with the same number of students. In the first,
students i and j make the same effort, but i gets a higher achievement than j. The
difference in their achievements must be due to differences in their circumstances because
they exert the same effort. In the second population, students i′ and j′ have the same
circumstance and effort variables as students i and j respectively, but greater differences in
their achievements. The rest of the students in the two populations are pairwise identical,
meaning that for each of the rest of the students in the first population there is a student
in the second population with exactly the same achievement, effort, and circumstance
variables. According to the ex-post compensation principle the inequality of opportunity
should be greater in the second population than in the first one.
Compensation principle. A measure of inequality of opportunity M satisfies com-
pensation if, for all d1 = (Y 1,C,E), d2 = (Y 2,C,E) ∈ D, such that there are δ ∈
R++ and i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,N} with Ei = Ej and Y 2i = Y 1i +δ > Y 1i ≥ Y 1j > Y 2j = Y 1j −δ,
and for all k /∈ {i, j} : Y 2k = Y 1k , then M(d1) <M(d2).
Among the different reward principles, only the utilitarian reward is considered in this
study. It proposes respecting the outcome inequality between individuals with homoge-
neous circumstances, since these differences are derived from efforts for which individuals
are responsible. Again we consider two populations with the same number of students.
In the first population, students i and j have equal circumstances, but the achievement
of student i is higher than that of student j. Since they are endowed with the same
circumstances, the differences in achievements are due to differences in efforts. In the
second population, students i′ and j′ have the same circumstances and efforts as i and j
respectively and greater differences in their achievements. The rest of the students in the
two populations are pairwise identical. According to the reward principle the inequality
of opportunity in both populations should be the same.
Reward principle. A measure of inequality of opportunity M satisfies reward prin-
ciple if, for all d1 = (Y 1,C,E), d2 = (Y 2,C,E) ∈ D, such that there are δ ∈ R++
and i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,N} with Ci = Cj and Y 2i = Y 1i + δ > Y 1i ≥ Y 1j > Y 2j = Y 1j − δ,
and for all k /∈ {i, j} : Y 2k = Y 1k , then M(d1) =M(d2).
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Therefore, whereas the compensation principle is formulated in terms of reducing the
inequality between individuals with the same effort, the reward principle is formulated
in terms of respecting the inequality between individuals with the same circumstances.
Fleurbaey and Peragine (2013) have proved that the compensation and reward principles
are not compatible.
In addition, a measure of inequality of opportunity should satisfy anonymity and repli-
cation invariance, which are two standard principles usually demanded of any inequality
measure. Anonymity establishes that for each student only their own achievement and
their corresponding vector of circumstances and efforts matter in evaluating inequality
of opportunity. Replication invariance enables us to compare populations with different
numbers of students. These two properties are formally stated as follows:
Anonymity. The measure M is invariant under permutation of individuals with
same achievements and same vectors of circumstances and efforts.
Replication invariance. The measure M is invariant under replication of the popu-
lation.
To empirically measure the inequality of opportunity in a given population, first we
assume that the link between achievements, circumstances and efforts is as follows,
Yi = G(Ci,Ei) i = 1, . . . ,N G : RKC × RKE → R++. (1.1)
Based on the above model, it is possible to build two different types of counterfactual
distributions. The first type of distribution can be constructed such that they reflect
only differences due to circumstances, i.e. counterfactuals in which all the differences due
to efforts have been eliminated. Thus, given a population d = (Y,C,E), we denote by
Y C(Y,C,E) the counterfactual distribution constructed in this way. A ‘direct’ inequality
of opportunity measure, denoted by MD evaluates inequality of opportunity as follows:
MD(Y,C,E) = I(Y C(Y,C,E)) (1.2)
where I is an inequality measure. The second type of counterfactual distribution consists
of those in which the differences due to circumstances have been removed. We denote
these counterfactuals by Y E(Y,C,E). An ‘indirect’ measure, MI evaluates inequality of
opportunity as the difference between the inequality in the current distribution Y and the
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inequality in the counterfactual distribution Y E, as follows:
MI(Y,C,E) = I(Y )− I(Y E(Y,C,E)). (1.3)
In the following chapters we will discuss under which conditions the measures MD and
MI fulfill the compensation and reward principles.
The selection of the inequality measure I depends on the characteristics of the vari-
able of interest. In the dataset that will be described in the next section, the educational
achievements are transformed through a standardization procedure that consists of both
a translation and a rescaling by the ratio. Since standardization is just a change in the
metric, there is no reason to change the inequality rankings between the countries after
this transformation. However all the relative inequality measures violate this principle,
that is, if inequality is measured according to any relative inequality index, the ranking
between two countries before standardization may be reversed once achievements have
been standardized. In contrast, the variance always preserves the rankings before and
after this kind of transformation. Moreover, as shown by Zheng (2007), the variance is
the only decomposable measure that preserves the rankings before and after standardiza-
tion.1 Consequently, if the idea is to avoid changes attributable to the standardization
of the original data, the variance must be selected in the analysis. In addition, choos-
ing the variance to evaluate the counterfactual distributions in Equations (1.2) and (1.3)
guarantees that the direct and indirect approaches coincide.
The estimation of the counterfactual distributions depends on the model specified
and the estimation procedure used. These distributions can be constructed following
a parametric or non-parametric approach. Whereas the parametric approach imposes
a functional form to estimate individuals’ achievements as a function of circumstances
and efforts, the non-parametric approach generally does not assume any functional form
and typically relies on averaging procedures. Both approaches are followed in this thesis
to construct counterfactual distributions and to measure the inequality of opportunity.
In the chapters that follow both of them are explained and implemented individually.
More precisely, Chapter 2 analyzes the inequality of opportunity based on parametrically
constructed counterfactual distributions. Instead, in Chapter 3 the distributions are con-
structed based on the non-parametrical procedure developed by Checchi and Peragine
1A decomposable measure guarantees that if inequality in one population subgroup increases then
overall inequality also increases.
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(2010).
1.3 Dataset
To measure inequality of opportunity as defined in Equations (1.2) or (1.3) one needs
to determine the outcome variable over which the inequality will be measured as well as
the set of circumstances and effort variables. This section presents the database provided
by the Program for International Student Assessment, PISA, which will be used in the
following two chapters.
1.3.1 PISA database
We take data from the fifth round of PISA conducted in 2012. PISA is a worldwide
study program supported by OECD and has been administered every three years since
2000. PISA 2012 provides internationally comparable insights into 15 year-old students
in 65 countries.2 The program primarily measures whether students about to conclude
compulsory education are able to apply what they have learned in the school to real-life
challenges OECD (2010). Accordingly, the assessment tests focus on core subjects such
as mathematics, reading and science, and every three years one of them is evaluated more
thoroughly, while the other two are tested as minor domains. In the PISA 2012 dataset
the main focus is on mathematics, hence, the educational achievements in our study are
represented by mathematical scores obtained by the students in the tests. It should also
be noted that PISA tests are low-stakes, meaning that scores are anonymous and have no
consequences for the test taker.
To measure the overall knowledge of students, PISA uses a complex technique that
enables them to measure a wide coverage of competencies while maintaining a moderate
testing time.3 In particular, each student answers only a limited subset of the total
number of questions and the responses of the questions that they did not have to answer
2The number of participating countries varies across PISA assessment cycles: 43 countries participated
in 2000, 41 countries in 2003, 57 countries in 2006, and 65 countries in 2009 and 2012.
3PISA includes a rotated test design that consists of allocating the main study questions into thirteen
clusters; seven of such clusters are used to assess the main competency — mathematics in PISA 2012— ,
and six to assess the remaining two competencies — reading and science in PISA 2012 —. Each student
answers a booklet that contains four clusters. To avoid plagiarism between students, there are thirteen
different booklets that vary according to the clusters included and their position within a booklet. Then
each student is randomly assigned one of the thirteen booklets.
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are inferred from their actual responses and characteristics. Thus, PISA follows the Item
Response Theory (IRT) to estimate the whole distribution of the likely ability of each
student based on the answered set of questions.4 Then five plausible values are randomly
drawn from each distribution to represent the likely performance of each student. These
values are standardized so that the average score of OECD countries is 500 and standard
deviation is 100. As mentioned in Section 1.2, this standardization procedure followed by
PISA is a crucial point for choosing the variance, which is the only inequality measure
that behaves properly under that linear transformation. The estimations that deal with
students’ achievements should be carried out for each plausible value separately, and then
averaged to obtain the final estimate. However, to simplify the empirical analysis, the
next two chapters focus on one, specifically the first, of the five plausible values. This
procedure is superior to the calculating the average of the five (OECD, 2009a; Causa and
Chapuis, 2011). As expected, results are robust to the use of either one of the values or
all of them.
The procedure used by PISA intends to guarantee that the sample properly represents
the target population. In this procedure, first of all, schools are sorted into strata (i.e. alike
groups), according to certain variables such as region, language of instruction, proportion
of immigrants and types of school, which are related to the characteristics of education
system of each country. After this classification, PISA selects the participant students
in two steps. At the first step, schools in each country are randomly chosen within
each strata.5 At the second step, 15 year-old students6 attending grade 7 or higher are
randomly selected from these schools.7
Dealing with survey data requires considering the sampling design. Therefore, the
final sampling weights are used to adjust the results for the unequal probabilities of being
4Essentially, IRT models are based on a function of the form,
P (x|θ, δ).
This equation provides the probability of scoring x in a given question subject to the latent ability of a
student θ and the test question parameter δ such as the difficulty of that question. Accordingly, the IRT
is used to obtain the distribution of the ability θ.
5Schools are selected with probabilities proportional to their size, meaning that larger schools present
a higher probability of being selected than smaller schools.
6PISA assesses students who are aged between 15 years and 3 (complete) months and 16 years and 2
(complete) months at the beginning of the assessment period.
7Usually 35 students are selected within the schools. If there are fewer than 35 fifteen-year-old students
in a school, then all the students are invited to participate in the assessment. In any case at least 20
students need to be selected from each school.
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selected and for the non-response of schools and students. Furthermore, due to the multi-
stage sampling procedure, students should not be assumed as independent observations,
as students attending the same school might be more similar than others attending a
different school. If this specific dependence between observations is not taken into account,
the standard errors of the regression estimations will be systematically underestimated.
Consequently, in the two following chapters we estimate the clustered standard errors in
the regressions to account for the nested sampling design.8
1.3.2 Selected countries
The analyses on inequality of opportunity in Chapters 2 and 3 are conducted in twenty
European countries drawn from the four different geographical areas in Europe: Bulgaria
(BGR), Croatia (HRV) and Romania (ROU) in Eastern Europe; Belgium (BEL), France
(FRA), Germany (DEU), Ireland (IRL), Luxembourg (LUX), The Netherlands (NLD),
Switzerland (CHE) and the United Kingdom (GBR) in Western Europe; Finland (FIN),
Iceland (ISL), Lithuania (LTU), Norway (NOR) and Sweden (SWE) in Northern Europe;
and Greece (GRC), Italy (ITA), Portugal (PRT) and Spain (ESP) in Southern Europe.
Our database contains information on about 160,000 students, who represent a population
of about four million. Education is compulsory for under 15s in all the countries considered
in this study, so there is no bias in the analysis related to the school leaving rate.
Information for mathematical achievements is presented in the second column block
in Table 1.1. It can be observed that only seven countries (Switzerland, The Netherlands,
Finland, Belgium, Germany, France and Ireland) have mean scores higher than the OECD
mean. By contrast, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Croatia and Sweden have the lowest
average values. The sixth column shows the standard deviations of math scores. Belgium,
France, Luxembourg and Germany have the highest values whereas the lowest can be
found in Romania, Finland, Ireland, Greece and Spain. It can be easily checked that since
the total standard deviation is 94.51, the total variance is 8931.64. From this value, more
than 95% is attributable to the within-country variance.9 This means that the greatest
8With the same purpose, Chapter 4 follows the multilevel regression analysis and the procedure is
detailed therein.
9The variance may be decomposed by population subgroups as the sum of two components. The
between-group component is the variance of a hypothetical distribution in which of the individuals in
each group enjoy the same mean. The within-group component is a weighted average of the variance in
each group where the weights are the population shares.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics for educational achievements
Sample and Population Math score Variance components (%)
Countries Sample
Weighted
sample
Mean Sd
Between sch.
variance
Within sch.
variance
Belgium BEL 8401 114194 518.42 101.21 52.68 47.32
Bulgaria BGR 5078 50617 444.70 92.05 52.65 47.35
Croatia HRV 4951 44793 471.28 87.74 45.98 54.02
Finland FIN 8670 58918 520.80 84.22 9.41 90.59
France FRA 4220 631010 503.14 96.63 56.39 43.61
Germany DEU 4802 720582 518.11 94.86 53.68 46.32
Greece GRC 4945 91020 458.30 85.69 32.20 67.80
Iceland ISL 3127 3718 494.92 92.57 12.39 87.61
Ireland IRL 4979 53351 501.35 84.39 20.79 79.21
Italy ITA 29486 487526 489.05 90.69 51.80 48.20
Lithuania LTU 4132 28876 485.15 87.41 31.44 68.56
Luxembourg LUX 5223 5484 489.84 95.37 32.05 67.95
Netherlands NLD 4382 193212 522.52 91.66 66.70 33.30
Norway NOR 4575 56941 489.73 89.53 14.76 85.24
Portugal PRT 5495 92189 487.87 93.50 31.58 68.42
Romania ROU 4875 130209 445.83 79.36 44.92 55.08
Spain ESP 24686 364230 485.15 87.27 21.37 78.63
Sweden SWE 4585 91713 477.38 90.25 15.00 85.00
Switzerland CHE 10475 73963 532.13 94.51 38.07 61.93
United Kingdom GBR 12538 679633 493.72 94.47 30.78 69.22
Total 159625 3972178 497.72 94.51
Summary statistics are calculated using the final student weight and the first plausible value reported by
PISA.
differences in the achievements in the selected countries are due to differences within each
country. Therefore, it may be worth analyzing and comparing these differences using the
same set of explanatory variables for each country.10 As a first step we analyze the two last
columns in Table 1.1 that report, for each country, the contribution of the between- and
the within-school variance to the total variance. These contributions vary greatly between
countries. For instance, in The Netherlands, France, Germany, Belgiumn, Bulgaria and
Italy, the between-school variance represents more than half of the total variance, meaning
that there are great disparities between schools. By contrast, in Nordic countries such as
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and in Ireland and Spain the schools seems to be more
homogeneous, with the highest contribution being due to the inequality within schools.
10We acknowledge that some important national features are not contemplated, for the set of expana-
tory variables are selected based on their general relevance in most countries rather than in each country
individually. However, the main purpose of the study is to analyze the manner the same channels affect
different countries, thus, we opt for the same set of variables.
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These patterns on between and within-school variances among European countries are in
line with those observed in Martins and Veiga (2010).
1.3.3 Selected variables
In addition to performing the tests, students answered a background questionnaire and
school principals completed a questionnaire about their schools. Accordingly, our database
is constructed by combining students’ math scores with the variables that rely on students’
and principals’ responses. All the selected variables are briefly described in Table 1.2. For
futher details on the definition and calculation of these variables, we suggest consulting
the PISA 2012 report (OECD, 2014).
Circumstance variables
Students’ circumstances, over which they have no control, are represented by their gender,
and factors related with their families, schools and peer groups. The paragraphs that
follow present the chosen circumstance variables and provide some motivation for their
selection.
i ) Family background
Numerous papers show the high effect of social origin on educational achievement (see
for instance Sirin (2005) and references therein as well as more recent studies Pokropek
et al. (2015); Schulz et al. (2017)). Social origin usually includes parental education,
parental occupation, and income or home resources, which, although correlated, measure
different aspects of family socio-economic status. In particular, the effect of household
resources on educational achievements has received great attention (Spiezia, 2010; Traynor
and Raykov, 2013) since it is believed that home possessions capture wealth better than
income because they reflect a more stable source of wealth.
In addition, immigration status is also considered a relevant feature when measur-
ing the influence of family background, since as stated by Hillmert (2013), the empir-
ical studies indicate that migrants are often disadvantaged regarding their educational
achievement, with their relative situation changing across countries.
Based on these references we select four indicators from the PISA database to represent
social origin: 1) immigration status (NAT), if at least one parent is born in the country, 2)
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Table 1.2: Description of explanatory variables
CIRCUMSTANCE VARIABLES
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
MALE Dummy variable equal to 1 if the student’s gender is male, 0 otherwise.
FAMILY BACKGROUND
NAT Dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one student’s parent is born in the country of the test, 0 otherwise.
PARED Highest level of parental education Based on students’ responses regarding parental education level,
classified using the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), PISA estimates the
number of years of schooling. The values range from 3 to 18.
HISEI Highest occupational status of parents coded according to the International Standard Classification of
Occupations (ISCO) and the international socio-economic index of occupational status (ISEI). The values
of this variable ranges from 16 to 90, lower values representing lower socio-economic status and higher
values representing higher socio-economic status.
HPOS Home possessions is based on students’ responses about the availability of 17 home items related to
wealth (a room of their own, a dishwasher, a link to the Internet, a DVD player, and three other country-
specic items), cultural possessions (classic literature, books of poetry and works of art), educational
resources (a desk and a quiet place to study, a computer that students can use for schoolwork, educational
software, books to help with students’ school work, technical reference books and a dictionary ) as well as
the number of books at home. For more details on how this information is aggregated, see the footnote
of this table. The values range from -6.69 to 4.15.
SCHOOL BACKGROUND
SCEDUR School’s educational resources based on school principals’ perceptions of potential factors facilitating
instruction at their school, such as school laboratory equipment, didactic material, computers for in-
struction, internet connectivity, computer software for instruction and library materials. For more details
on how this information is aggregated, see the footnote of this table. The values range between -3.59
and 1.97.
MACTIV Mathematics-related extra-curricular activities at school indicates the number of extracurricular activ-
ities which are related with mathematics offered by the school (such as additional mathematics lessons
and mathematics competitions). The values range from 0 to 5.
TCCLIM Teacher related factors affecting school climate derived from school principals’ reports on the extent to
which teachers encourage students, cover students’ needs, have good relationships with students, are not
absent, are on time, are well prepared, etc. For more details on how this information is aggregated, see
the footnote of this table. The values range from -3.27 to 2.85.
TCMOR Teacher morale derived from school principals’ reports on the extent to which teachers show high morale,
high enthusiasm, pride in the school and positive valuation of academic achievement. For more details
on how this information is aggregated, see the footnote of this table. The values range from -3.97 to
1.44.
TCSHORT Teacher shortage indicates the presence of qualified teachers. For more details on how this information
is aggregated, see the footnote of this table. The values range between -1.09 and 3.59.
PEER GROUP EFFECT
P Average mathematical achievements of students’ schoolmates.
EFFORT VARIABLES
HWORK Average number of hours per week spent doing homework or other study set by teachers.
NSKIP Dummy variable equal to 1 if the student has not skipped classes in the two weeks before the PISA test,
0 otherwise.
PERSEV Perseverance constructed using student responses about their willingness to work on problems that are
difficult, their interest in working on a task until it is perfectly accomplished, and their readiness to do
more than is expected of them. For more details on how this information is aggregated, see the footnote
of this table. The values range from -4.05 to 3.52.
ATSC Attitude towards school constructed using student responses about their perception of the usefulness
and benefits of school. For more details on how this information is aggregated, see the footnote of this
table. The values range from -2.99 to 2.35.
NREP Dummy variable equal to 1 if the student has never repeated any grade either at primary or secondary
education, 0 otherwise.
HPOS, SCEDUR, TCCLIM, TCMOR, TCSHORT, PERSEV and ATSC are PISA’s scale indices constructed by combining
and coding different items from the context questionnaires based on the Item Response Theory (IRT) scaling procedure.
IRT methodology attempts to infer the true value of latent traits from observed item responses, by taking into account
the heterogeneity in the difficulty of given items. This complex technique makes it possible to summarize data instead of
dealing with many single items. The estimated values are then standardized to scales with an OECD average of 0 and
a standard deviation of 1. These scores can be interpreted by comparing them to the OECD mean (for more detais, see
OECD, 2014).
the highest level of parental education (PARED), 3) the highest occupational status of the
parents (HISEI), and 4) home possessions (HPOS), which is a summary index based on
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students’ responses about 14 household items including wealth durables, cultural items,
educational resources and number of books at home.11
ii ) Characteristics of schools
There is also general agreement about the influence of the school in educational
achievements. Since students spend a relatively large part of their time at school, the char-
acteristics of schools and teachers appear to affect their learning. Therefore we consider
the information on the availability of school resources that facilitate instruction (SCE-
DUR). These include factors such as access to laboratory equipment, didactic material,
computers for instruction, Internet connectivity, computer software for instruction and li-
brary materials. The number of mathematics-related extra-curricular activities offered at
school (MACTIV) is also included, since these can facilitate student learning. Regarding
teacher-related aspects, we account for factors affecting school climate (TCCLIM) which
reflect to what extent teachers encourage students, cover students’ needs and relate well to
them. In addition, we also consider teachers’ morale, enthusiasm and pride in the school
and their positive valuation of academic achievement (TCMOR). These variables may
include not only norms and values, but also quality relationships and general atmosphere
(OECD, 2012). Finally, the number of qualified teachers at school (TCSHORT) is also
taken into account.12
iii ) Peer effects
Growing literature on the economics of education find that the influence of peers is
a powerful determinant of students’ educational achievements. Students in a group help
and interact with each other and contribute in the formation of group values. In that
regard, high achieving peers may foster a more effective learning process where teachers
are interrupted less frequently. Thus, students tend to perform better if their fellow
students are high achievers. Sacerdote (2011) and Ewijk and Sleegers (2010) for instance,
11These variables are based on the information provided by the students rather than by their parents.
In only a few countries (Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Italy and Portugal) the parents compleated a
questionnaire.
12We are aware that in many countries the type of school is an important determinant of achievement.
However, we are not able to include this kind of variable in our model. The reason is two-fold. First, there
is no information in the PISA dataset about specific organization issues. For example, no information is
provided about the different types of schools into which students are sorted in countries such as Belgium,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania and Switzerland. Second,
even if the type of school is provided, for instance public versus private, the classification of schools does
not follow the same criterion across countries.
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provide comprehensive surveys on this topic.
However, the choice of relevant groups is strictly constrained by data availability.
In particular, the PISA datasets do not provide any information about students’ social
networks or about their classmates. Therefore, the peer groups are defined at school
level. As a matter of fact, not all the students are sampled within a school and this
generates a measurement error in the peer variable.13 For this reason, we consider only
schools for which at least 15 students have been interviewed, so that the sample size
is large enough to build a peer variable that can be representative (Raitano and Vona,
2013, 2016). Another data limitation is that PISA does not give any prior information
specifying the composition of peer groups. Nevertheless, despite the complexity involved
in including peer group effects in the model, the conclusions obtained may help to better
understand the differences in achievements. Therefore, following the related literature
Hanushek et al. (2003); Entorf and Lauk (2008); Boucher et al. (2014) we capture the
effect of peers by measuring the average level of achievement of the rest of the students
attending the same school.
Econometric research on the identification of peer effects has been strongly influenced
by the work of Manski (1993) which, among other problems, defines that of reflection or
simultaneity. This emerges because the achievements of students in a peer group evolve
in an interdependent manner: average performance of the peer group affects individual
performance but, simultaneously, this last also affects the average of the group. Accord-
ingly, the endogeneity of these peer effects is accounted for when estimating the models
of interest. We provide more details on this in Chapter 2.
iv ) Descriptive statistics for circumstance variables
Table 1.3 presents the descriptive statistics of circumstance variables. As is shown, in
all countries the ratio between girls and boys is balanced. The percentage of students with
at least one parent born in the country is higher than 85%, except for Luxembourg (54%)
and Switzerland (76%). It is worth noting that in Bulgaria and Romania almost all the
students are native, given that the migration patterns of both countries are characterized
by emigration. The mean value for PARED for the countries in our dataset is 13.58.
13Micklewright et al. (2012) measure the case of error-in-variables by comparing the peer group measure
based on administrative complete microdata and that based on peers in the PISA sample. They find
that the estimated peer effect is biased downwards when drawing a measure for peers based on a PISA
sample.
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Portugal has the lowest value with 10.91, followed by Spain, France, and Italy. Iceland
with 16.23 and Finland with nearly 15 have the highest values. The lowest values for
HISEI are those of Portugal, Romania and Croatia, and the highest are those of Iceland
and Norway. Romania, Croatia and Bulgaria are the lowest ranked countries according
to HPOS while Iceland and Norway are the highest.
Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics for circumstance variables: Mean and standard deviation in paren-
thesis for continuous variables and percentage for dichotomous ones
Country MALE NAT PARED HISEI HPOS SCEDUR MACTIV TCCLIM TCMOR TCSHORT
Belgium 0.50 0.85 14.46 51.44 0.00 0.30 1.64 -0.25 -0.26 -0.27
(2.69) (21.74) (0.81) (0.96) (1.04) (0.83) (0.89) (0.96)
Bulgaria 0.50 0.99 13.91 48.44 -0.30 0.01 2.68 0.42 0.22 0.83
(3.13) (21.13) (0.98) (0.87) (1.45) (1.31) (0.88) (0.46)
Croatia 0.51 0.88 13.65 44.99 -0.41 -0.51 2.80 -0.32 -0.30 0.43
(2.58) (20.44) (0.77) (0.66) (1.32) (0.87) (0.92) (0.78)
Finland 0.51 0.97 14.97 55.59 0.15 -0.21 2.18 -0.08 0.33 0.45
(2.10) (20.32) (0.77) (0.82) (1.06) (0.77) (0.83) (0.66)
France 0.48 0.86 13.04 51.97 0.02 0.40 2.09 -0.16 -0.39 0.17
(2.04) (21.30) (0.77) (0.94) (1.25) (0.87) (0.97) (0.84)
Germany 0.50 0.87 14.05 50.59 0.25 0.11 2.33 -0.31 0.01 -0.37
(3.06) (19.42) (0.78) (0.85) (1.31) (0.68) (0.87) (0.83)
Greece 0.49 0.92 14.02 49.13 -0.18 -0.35 1.43 -0.17 -0.40 0.42
(2.93) (22.81) (0.88) (0.97) (1.11) (1.17) (1.09) (0.95)
Iceland 0.50 0.96 16.23 59.36 0.71 -0.34 1.89 -0.01 0.55 -0.15
(2.39) (19.30) (0.86) (0.88) (1.24) (0.86) (0.92) (0.84)
Ireland 0.51 0.90 13.56 52.34 0.21 0.12 1.82 0.11 0.51 0.14
(2.31) (20.98) (0.87) (0.94) (1.26) (0.94) (0.93) (0.81)
Italy 0.51 0.93 13.33 46.92 0.18 0.05 2.47 -0.31 -0.60 -0.26
(3.27) (20.77) (0.86) (0.87) (1.03) (0.91) (0.90) (0.89)
Lithuania 0.49 0.99 14.14 51.21 -0.15 0.15 2.95 0.54 0.38 0.68
(2.31) (23.24) (0.84) (0.68) (1.16) (0.77) (0.80) (0.58)
Luxembourg 0.51 0.54 13.57 49.00 0.26 0.04 2.50 -0.31 0.00 -1.12
(3.83) (21.79) (0.97) (0.78) (1.09) (0.72) (0.76) (0.92)
Netherlands 0.51 0.89 13.87 55.93 0.15 0.19 1.27 -0.84 -0.19 -0.58
(2.26) (20.08) (0.68) (0.91) (0.93) (0.51) (0.81) (0.85)
Norway 0.51 0.90 13.85 58.74 0.65 -0.18 1.00 -0.48 0.24 -0.30
(1.84) (19.15) (0.92) (0.80) (0.99) (0.75) (0.88) (0.85)
Portugal 0.51 0.93 10.91 42.24 0.10 0.17 3.27 0.13 -0.16 0.81
(4.21) (21.23) (0.97) (0.90) (0.89) (0.94) (0.97) (0.65)
Romania 0.50 0.99 13.64 42.41 -0.55 0.26 2.94 0.58 -0.03 0.55
(2.26) (21.35) (1.04) (0.80) (1.14) (0.98) (0.87) (0.72)
Spain 0.51 0.90 12.38 46.97 0.11 0.02 1.36 -0.19 -0.42 0.74
(3.69) (21.45) (0.84) (0.86) (1.05) (0.93) (0.98) (0.62)
Sweden 0.50 0.85 14.03 54.16 0.29 0.03 1.62 -0.11 0.38 0.05
(2.32) (20.59) (0.85) (0.82) (1.08) (1.02) (0.88) (0.84)
Switzerland 0.50 0.76 14.01 55.04 0.00 0.57 1.40 0.01 0.29 -0.05
(2.97) (21.07) (0.75) (0.90) (0.94) (0.74) (0.87) (0.87)
United Kingdom 0.49 0.87 14.14 54.96 0.19 0.51 3.95 0.38 0.45 0.19
(1.96) (20.56) (0.92) (1.02) (1.03) (1.02) (0.89) (0.86)
0.50 0.89 13.58 50.86 0.11 0.20 2.40 -0.11 -0.09 0.06
(2.84) (21.05) (0.86) (0.93) (1.42) (0.94) (0.98) (0.91)
Data are weighted by the final student weight.
As regards school background, Table 1.3 shows that Croatia, Greece, and Iceland
have the lowest values in SCEDUR, while Switzerland and the United Kingdom have the
highest. The United Kingdom and Portugal offer the most extra-curricular activities, and
Norway and The Netherlands offer the fewest. Moreover, Lithuania and Romania have the
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highest TCCLIM values, while The Netherlands and Norway have the lowest. Teachers in
Iceland, Ireland, and the United Kingdom are considered as the most enthusiastic, while
those in Italy, Spain, and Greece rank as the least. Portugal, Bulgaria, and Spain have
the highest numbers of qualified teachers, while Luxembourg has the lowest.
Effort variables
In view of the richness of information provided by PISA, we propose introducing in the
analyses variables that can be considered as proxies for efforts. We are aware of the
challenge that our proposal entails. First of all, there are some views that consider all
the actions of a child as determined by parental influence, and hence beyond the child’s
responsibility. Therefore, we need proxies that are to some extent within students’ control.
To tackle these issues we base our work on previous studies which seek to determine
the extent to which students’ efforts and socioeconomic conditions are in fact distinct
variables. Bozick and Depmsey (2010) review studies that analyze student effort and, in
addition, de Fraja et al. (2010), Eren and Henderson (2011), Metcalfe et al. (2011) and
Kuehn and Landeras (2014) analyze the impact of efforts on educational achievements,
focusing on students aged between twelve and sixteen. In line with these studies, we select
some variables related to students’ attitudes, perseverance and motivation as proxies for
effort. In particular we select the five variables summarized in Table 1.4.
The first one is Homework, denoted by HWORK, which is based on the number of
hours of study per week. This is the most common proxy for effort in all the studies
that assess the impact of effort on education outcomes (see for instance Stinebrickner
and Stinebrickner, 2004; de Fraja et al., 2010; Kuehn and Landeras, 2014). The second
effort variable is No Truancy, NSKIP, which is also frequently used in empirical studies
(Schuman et al., 1985; Bonesrønning and Opstad, 2012, 2015, for instance) and seeks
to reflect the responsibility of students and the interest shown in lessons. We also select
Perseverance, PERSEV, which is an aggregated index based on students’ responses about
their willingness to work on problems that are difficult and their interest in working on
assignments until they are fully completed. The fourth variable is Attitude towards School,
ATSC, which describes how students perceive the usefulness and benefits of school, and
can be considered a proxy for effort since students who are more interested will tend to
exert more effort. These last two variables are closely related to non-cognitive aspects of
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students and are frequently used in psychological studies (see for instance Rosen et al.,
2010) and are quite similar to the proxies introduced by de Fraja et al. (2010) to evaluate
students’ efforts.
The last variable considered as a proxy for effort is Non Repeater, NREP. It should
be mentioned that there are major differences in education policies between the countries
analyzed in regard to this variable. In Norway, for instance, students go forward auto-
matically regardless of their academic performance. In Iceland the decision is taken by
students themselves, while elsewhere, e.g. in Spain, it is taken by the faculty (for more
details on the different regulations see Borodankova and Coutinho, 2011). However, since
the regressions are estimated for each country separately, the different policies do not af-
fect the final results. We consider it of interest to include this variable in the study, since
in those countries where students do not go forward automatically the fact of repeating a
grade involves perseverance, attitude, and motivation towards schoolwork to some extent.
As shown in many empirical studies, efforts generally depend to a large extent on
circumstances. Given the nature of the data under analysis, we consider that students’
efforts must be cleaned from the circumstance effects, so that the vector of circumstances
incorporates the direct effect of circumstances and their indirect effect through the stu-
dents’ efforts. As will be explained in Chapter 2, the cleansing process can be tracked by
following the proposal of Jusot et al. (2013) and dealing with the correlation between
effort and circumstance variables on the circumstance side.14
i ) Descriptive statistics for effort variables
As shown in Table 1.4, students from Italy, Ireland, and Romania spend most hours
doing homework and those from Finland spend the fewest. Students from Belgium, Ger-
many, and Luxembourg are least likely to skip classes whereas more than 40% of students
from Greece and Romania have recently done so. The least persevering students are those
from France, Norway, and Belgium while the most persevering are those from Bulgaria.
Moreover, The Netherlands and Norway have the lowest ATSC values, while students
from Lithuania have the highest. Finally, whereas the lowest rate of non-repeater stu-
dents are observed in Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain, the highest are found
14Actually, Jusot et al. (2013) also propose the alternative way to deal with the correlation, that is,
adding all the correlation to efforts. However, we have decided not to present the results obtained under
this approach since the efforts of 15-year-old students are deemed to be highly influenced by parents’
pressure.
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in Norway, Iceland, Greece, Croatia and Romania.
Table 1.4: Descriptive statistics for effort variables: Mean and standard deviation in
parenthesis for continuous variables and percentage for dichotomous ones
Country HWORK NSKIP PERSEV ATSC NREP
Belgium 5.42 0.92 -0.34 -0.11 0.65
(4.09) (0.82) (0.75)
Bulgaria 5.62 0.67 0.59 -0.10 0.97
(4.71) (1.00) (0.82)
Croatia 5.93 0.76 0.10 0.09 0.98
(4.85) (0.88) (0.84)
Finland 2.79 0.85 -0.01 0.05 0.96
(2.03) (0.78) (0.82)
France 5.09 0.83 -0.47 0.10 0.76
(3.59) (0.91) (0.85)
Germany 4.60 0.92 -0.02 -0.06 0.80
(3.04) (0.73) (0.83)
Greece 5.30 0.57 -0.09 -0.18 0.98
(4.89) (0.86) (0.83)
Iceland 4.11 0.88 -0.11 0.04 0.99
(3.04) (0.84) (0.85)
Ireland 7.29 0.87 0.14 0.12 0.91
(4.71) (0.89) (0.89)
Italy 8.73 0.66 0.04 0.00 0.85
(6.20) (0.88) (0.80)
Lithuania 6.76 0.68 0.17 0.43 0.98
(4.66) (0.72) (1.00)
Luxembourg 4.51 0.93 -0.07 -0.07 0.65
(3.37) (0.82) (0.88)
Netherlands 5.78 0.89 -0.13 -0.36 0.72
(4.15) (0.70) (0.61)
Norway 4.78 0.88 -0.37 -0.27 1.00
(3.61) (0.97) (0.78)
Portugal 3.72 0.71 0.35 0.22 0.65
(3.19) (0.91) (0.89)
Romania 7.11 0.55 0.03 -0.02 0.98
(5.58) (0.82) (0.88)
Spain 6.33 0.68 0.09 0.27 0.67
(4.78) (0.84) (0.92)
Sweden 3.55 0.79 -0.28 -0.15 0.96
(2.85) (0.87) (0.81)
Switzerland 4.00 0.89 -0.14 0.05 0.81
(2.97) (0.77) (0.85)
United Kingdom 4.94 0.88 0.12 0.13 0.97
(3.76) (0.87) (0.87)
5.58 0.81 -0.06 0.03 0.83
(4.44) (0.87) (0.85)
Data are weighted by the final student weight.
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1.3.4 Missing values
Finally, we indicate the manner in which we have addressed the issue of missing values in
the PISA 2012 database. All the information used in this study is reported by students
who failed to complete all the items in their respective questionnaires. In particular there
are some variables, such as parents’ education, where missing values are concentrated
more in the questionnaires of students with below-average achievements. This means
that the missing data in our database is not completely random, so the systematic dif-
ference between missing values and observed values can be explained by differences in
the observed data. Based on this assumption, we impute missing values through the
procedure introduced by Buuren et al. (1999), known as Multiple Imputations Chained
Equations (MICE).
This approach imputes missing datasets on a variable by variable basis, specifying an
imputation model for each of them. That is, in a set of variables with missing values, these
are ordered from those with the least to those with most missing values. Then, the one
with the least is regressed on the rest of the variables and its missing values are replaced
by simulated draws from the posterior predicted distribution. This process is repeated
until all the missing values are replaced with their imputed values in all the variables.
Following Royston and White (2011), we choose 50 cycles for the imputations that are
needed for the convergence of the sampling distribution of imputed values. The entire
procedure is repeated independently five times, yielding five imputed datasets. Finally,
we compute the average of the five imputed values to obtain the final dataset on which
the study is based. Taking into consideration that efforts are assumed to be influenced by
circumstances, the imputation is carried out in two steps. First, we impute the values for
the missing observations in circumstance variables. Then we impute the missing values for
effort variables based on the circumstance variables with no missing observations obtained
in the first step. Thus effort variables may be influenced by circumstances, but not the
other way around.
1.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we describe the basic notions of inequality of opportunity. It is stated that
any measure should satisfy either compensation or reward principles. In addition, most
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empirical studies in this field use parametric or non-parametric approaches for construct-
ing counterfactual distributions in order to measure inequality of opportunity.
Furthermore, we present the variables of interest from the PISA 2012 dataset and we
provide their descriptive statistics for twenty European countries. It is observed that from
the total variance in achievements, more than 95% is attributable to the within-country
variance. Hence, it is worthwhile to evaluate the differences in the achievements within
each country, and in particular, to analyze and compare the channels of the differences
using the same set of explanatory variables for each country. We find that in Western
countries such as The Netherlands, France, Germany and Belgium as well as in Bulgaria
and Italy, the largest differences are observed between schools. Contrastingly, in Nordic
countries such as Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, and in Ireland and Spain the
variation is larger within schools. Therefore, it seems that in the latter countries the
schools are more homogeneous than in the former ones.
The circumstances are selected such that they capture the factors beyond students’
control, such as their families’ social origin, the school- and teacher-background as well
as their peers’ characteristics. We find three main limitations for their identification in
PISA datasets. First, the information on family background is reported by the students
rather than by their parents. In fact, in only a few countries (Belgium, Croatia, Germany,
Italy and Portugal) the parents compleated a questionnaire. Second, the information on
teacher-related background is reported by the school principals rather than by the teachers
themselves. Finally, class-level information is not available for identifying peers’ features,
and thus, the peer group of a student is determined as the rest of students attending the
same school.
With regard to efforts, we select proxies that appear to be within students’ control to
some considerable extent, based on previous studies. The main disadvantage of our effort
variables is that they rely on the self-reported information from students. As Swerdzewski
et al. (2011) warned, self-reported measures suffer from limitations; for instance, they
require that students accurately be able to report their level of motivation, and in addition,
it is difficult to ascertain whether students are being truthful when reporting their effort.
In addition to these limitations, PISA has also been subject to some criticisms in the
literature. First, the PISA tests are independent of the participating countries’ school
curricula, because the focus is on assessing students’ abilities to apply their skills to
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everyday life situations. This fact limits the possibility to establish clear relationships
between schools’ educational practices and students’ performance. Therefore, it is difficult
to draw conclusions about school-related factors.
Furthermore, the degree of interest in succeeding in a low-stake assessment such as
PISA might be cultural, and may vary across countries (see Hambleton et al., 2004). For
instance, some governments or schools may have attempted to make students aware of the
honor of being chosen to represent their country or school, and hence, these students may
have the responsibility to perform well. Instead, for students in other countries or schools,
PISA assessment may have been seen as just an irrelevant activity, because this has no
impact on their course grade. According to Wainer (1993), the differential motivation to
perform on the test could lead to distort the findings.
Another criticism concerns the linguistic equivalence and cultural relevance of PISA
assessment materials. Due to the poor translation as well as the differences in language,
culture and curriculum coverage, the adapted forms may not be comparable to the source
versions (English and French). This could be a source of bias (Grisay et al., 2007; Nardi,
2008; Hopfenbeck et al., 2018).
Despite these limitations, PISA has been a major instrument in providing data for
European education systems. Although the program could be improved, it provides rich
information in order to investigate inequalities related with family and school backgrounds
across countries.
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Chapter 2
Re-examining the inequality of
opportunity measurement following
a parametric approach
29
	
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we use a parametric approach to build counterfactual distributions. Our
procedure consists of estimating a linear model for each country, regressing achievements
over the whole set of circumstance and effort variables presented in Chapter 1. Then we
build up a counterfactual distribution for each country in which the differences due to
effort are removed. The inequality of opportunity is measured by the variance applied to
the counterfactual distributions.
There are numerous papers that assess inequality of opportunity in education using
parametric procedures. Most of them are based on the regression analysis that estimates
the direct association between parental background and students’ performance rather than
being based on counterfactual distributions (see for instance Wo¨ßmann, 2004; Schu¨tz
et al., 2007; Wo¨ßmann and Peterson, 2007; Ammermueller, 2007; Raitano and Vona,
2016). In addition, the few studies that do depend on parametrically constructed coun-
terfactual distributions take into account only certain circumstance variables, related to
personal characteristics, family and school background (Martins and Veiga, 2010; Ferreira
and Gignoux, 2014; Salehi-Isfahani et al., 2014). The only exception, as far as we know, is
the study of Asadullah et al. (2018) where in fact effort variables are considered together
with circumstance ones.
As mentioned in the introduction, this chapter contributes to the empirical measure-
ment of inequality of opportunity in different ways. First, we consider the proxy variables
for effort in the construction of counterfactual distributions. The proxies are chosen based
on previous studies which analyze how students’ efforts affect their achievements, focus-
ing on students aged between twelve and sixteen. Furthermore, as achievements may
be affected by circumstances both directly and indirectly through efforts, we follow the
procedure implemented by Jusot et al. (2013) to clean the contribution of efforts of that
impact. The correlation is transferred to the side of circumstances. This specification
enables us to capture the direct and indirect impact of those variables.
Second, the side of circumstances also comprises the students’ peer effects. The liter-
ature indicates that outcomes may be influenced not only by students social origin and
by their school background but also by their schoolmates’ behaviour (see for instance,
Hanushek et al., 2003; Hoxby, 2000; McEwan, 2003; Sacerdote, 2001; Schneeweis and
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Winter-Ebmer, 2007; Lavy et al., 2012; Boucher et al., 2014). In particular, if everyone in
the group is high achieving, the achievement of a student is likely to be positively affected
by belonging to such a group. However, that student may simultaneously have an impact
on the other team members’ average achievement. Therefore, considering the endogene-
ity of peer effects, we use an instrumental variables based estimator to reach consistency.
Although the inclusion of these effects is limited by the lack of information on students’
social networks and classmates, the obtained results may help to better understand the
differences in achievements.
Thirdly, as recently shown by Van de gaer and Ramos (2015b), evaluating inequality
of opportunity by applying a standard inequality measure to a counterfactual distribu-
tion does not guarantee that a progressive transfer among individuals exerting the same
effort will reduce inequality of opportunity. However, this ‘transfer principle’ is a crucial
property in the measuring of inequality. The authors show that this problem is closely
related to the treatment of the residuals obtained in a parametric estimation, and identify
counterfactual distributions that behave properly as regards the transfer principle. The
results presented in this paper are based on the counterfactuals for which the transfer
property is guaranteed and, in consequence, the measure we obtain is a ‘true’ inequality
measure. Moreover, since the side of circumstances includes both the correlation with the
efforts as well as the residuals, the values obtained are indeed upper-bounds of the actual
inequality of opportunity.
Finally, we evaluate the contributions of different circumstances to the overall achieve-
ment inequality.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the estimation
strategy, Section 2.3 presents the results, and Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 The estimation strategy
In this section we describe the estimation strategy for building counterfactuals. First
we specify the model and present the estimation procedure used to estimate the effect
of circumstances on achievements. Then, we describe the method used to construct
counterfactual distributions. Finally, we indicate how to measure the contributions of
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different sources to achievement inequality.
2.2.1 Model specification
Let yi be the educational achievement of student i, i = 1, . . . , N , Ci = (c1i, . . . , ckci) the
vector of kc ≤ KC observed circumstances and Ei = (e1i, . . . , ekei) the vector of ke ≤ KE
observed effort variables. Assuming a lineal relation, Model (1.1) presented in Chapter 1
can be rewritten as follows:
yi = α + β Ci + γ Ei + ui i = 1, . . . , N, (2.1)
where the coefficients β and γ measure the marginal effects of circumstances and efforts,
respectively, and ui is a zero-mean error that captures random effects, factors such as
preferences or luck, the influence of non-measurable or unobserved variables, and also
errors derived from possible misspecification of the functional forms. Since efforts are
usually influenced by circumstances, these last can affect achievements both directly and
indirectly through efforts. According to Roemer’s definition of inequality of opportunity
(see for instance Roemer, 1998), students’ efforts should be cleaned from any influence of
circumstances, and the influence of the common part between circumstances and efforts
must be attributed to the former. This is particularly uncontroversial in our analysis of
educational achievements, where the variables that we take as proxies for effort can be
highly influenced by personal characteristics, by family and school background and by
peer effects. Assuming a linear relationship between circumstances and efforts leads to
the following equation:
Ei = δ + φCi + Ei (2.2)
where δ is the constant term, φ is a matrix of coefficients linking circumstance variables
to effort variables and Ei is the part of effort that is not explained by circumstances.
Inserting Equation (2.2) into Equation (2.1) it follows that
yi = α + βCi + γ(δ + φCi + Ei) + ui = (α + γδ) + (β + γφ)Ci + γEi + ui, (2.3)
which can be rewritten as,
yi = α
R + βRCi + γ
REi + ui (2.4)
leading to a model that fits Roemer’s framework indicated by the superscript R. Note that
Equation (2.3), which is non linear in coefficients, allows us to compare the coefficients
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of Models (2.1) and (2.4). Both models use the same information so that the predicted
achievement is the same. It can be observed that the marginal influences of efforts are
the same, i.e. γR = γ and that the overall effect of circumstances, βR, is the sum
of their marginal effect β, and the effect derived from the common part γφ. That is,
βR measures the total effect of circumstances on achievements,1 including the impact of
effort variables or unobserved variables correlated with the circumstance variables used.
Finally, αR is the sum of the constant term α and the effect derived from the common
part γδ. Theoretically, better circumstances should contribute positively to achievements
and efforts, and higher efforts should translate into better achievements. Consequently,
the estimated total effects for circumstances in Model (2.4) should not be smaller than
the marginal effects estimated in (2.1).
In practice, estimating Equation (2.4) requires E to be calculated. This can be done
by linearly regressing efforts on circumstances using an appropriate estimator according
to the characteristics of each effort variable. Formally,
Ei = δ + φCi + i. (2.5)
The residuals (ˆi) obtained in these regressions are orthogonal to circumstances when
the effort variable is continuous. However, when the effort variable is not continuous
the estimation procedure is non-linear, therefore, we compute generalized residuals (see
Gourieroux et al., 1987) in order to preserve the orthogonality conditions between the
residuals and circumstances. Thus, in any case, the residuals (ˆi) are adequate proxies
for Ei in Equation (2.4), as they capture the part of effort that is not explained by
circumstances. This estimation strategy is also used in Jusot et al. (2013), among others,
to analyze inequality of opportunity in health.
2.2.2 Model estimation
In this study the peer group variable, denoted by P , is the last circumstance variable
in the data matrix X = (1,C1, . . . ,Ckc−1, P, E1, . . . , Eke). This is defined as the average
achievement of the ith student’s schoolmates,
Pi =
1
NSi − wsi
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
yjw
s
jIij, (2.6)
1If standard desirable regression assumptions hold, then E(βˆR) = β + γφ.
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where wsi is the within school weight for the ith student
2, NSi is the number of students
in the school Si to which student i belongs, and Iij is the indicator that takes value one
if the jth student goes to the same school as the ith student.
The estimation of Equation (2.4) should take into account that the above mentioned
peer variable P may be endogenous due to the simultaneity problem, and in that case,
the OLS estimator would be inconsistent. One common strategy to adequately address
endogeneity is to use an estimation procedure based on instrumental variables (IV here-
after) methods. This estimation procedure relies on some instruments labelled Zi, which
must satisfy two conditions in order to reach consistency. First, these must be correlated
with the regressor which presents endogeneity problems (Pi in our case). Second, they
must be conditionally uncorrelated with the error term. These conditions are known as
relevance and exogeneity conditions respectively.
In our study, we propose to use an Instrument Variable Efficient Feasible Generalized
Methods of Moments (IV-EFGMM) estimator. This provides an efficiency gain compared
to OLS and IV estimators in the presence of valid instruments, and the unknown het-
eroskedasticity pattern emerged from the clustered nature of the error term (see Baum
et al., 2003; Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004). The IV-EFGMM estimator is based on
some moment conditions assuming the incorrelation between instruments and the error
term,
gi(β) = E(zi(yi − xiβ)) = 0, (2.7)
where yi is the ith observation of y, and the vectors xi and zi are the ith rows of the data
matrix X and the instrumental matrix Z, respectively. Given a sample, the estimator is
derived as the solution to the analogous sample moments,
g¯(β) = N−1
N∑
i
(zi(yi − xiβ)) = 0. (2.8)
If X and Z are of the same order, there are as many equations as unknown coefficients,
and thus, the system of equations is exactly identified. In this case, the estimator is
denoted as the method of moments estimator, and it has a unique closed form expression.
Nevertheless, when the rank of Z is larger than the rank of X, the system is overidentified,
since there are more equations than unknown coefficients. In such cases, although the
estimator cannot fulfill the condition (2.8), this is obtained such that it is as close to zero
2See OECD (2009b).
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as possible. Thus, the estimator is that which minimizes the distance, measured by the
quadratic form, from g¯(β) to zero,
βˆIV−EFGMM(W ) = arg minβ N−1g¯(β)′Wg¯(β), (2.9)
where the positive definite weight matrix W accounts for heteroskedasticity and correla-
tions in the error term. Even though the estimator can sometimes be derived analitically
from the optimization problem, often the estimations must be obtained through numerical
methods. The following paragraphs explain the basic steps of the estimation procedure
of this kind.
First step: Instruments and initial consistent estimator.
In the presence of more than one available instrument, the best choice in terms of
efficiency is to use a combination of the whole set of instruments. To that end, we run an
auxiliary regression of the peer variable Pi on the whole set of instruments Zi,
Pi = pi0 +
kc−1∑
`=1
Zc`ipi
c
` +
ke∑
`=1
Ze`ipi
e
` +
kc−1∑
`=1
C`iδ
c
` +
ke∑
`=1
E`iδe` + vi. (2.10)
In this equation, our instruments are defined as peers’ average circumstances (Zc` ) and
orthogonalized efforts (Ze` ), which are calculated similarly to peers’ average achievements.
That is, the instrument for the `th circumstance is obtained as,
Zc`i =
1
NSi − wsi
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
C`jw
s
jIij ` = 1, . . . , kc − 1, (2.11)
and for `th orthogonalized efforts as,
Ze`i =
1
NSi − wsi
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
E`jwsjIij ` = 1, . . . , ke. (2.12)
Whereas {C`}kc−1`=1 and {E`}ke`=1 are known as included instruments, Zc` and Ze` are
denoted as excluded ones, referring to whether they are regressors which are included in
the main model (2.4) or not.
The estimation of Equation (2.10) gives the best instrument as the linear combi-
nation of the multiple available instruments (Pˆ ). Thus the instrumental matrix, Z =
(1,C1, . . . ,Ckc−1, Pˆ , E1, . . . , Eke), enables us to estimate consistently model (2.4) by using
the generalized Instrumental Variable Estimator (GIVE)
β˜GIV E = (X
′Z(Z ′Z)−1Z ′X)−1X ′Z(Z ′Z)−1Z ′Y. (2.13)
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When only one instrument is valid, the order of the instrument matrix and the data
matrix is the same, and hence, there is no need to run the auxiliary regression (2.10). In
this case the matrix Z ′X is square and non-singular, so the resulting estimator becomes
the usual Instrumental Variable (IV) estimator. In the case that all explanatory variables
are exogenous, the OLS estimator is reached.
Second step: Initial consistent estimator for the variance covariance matrix of
the errors.
Although the presence of heteroskedasticity or clustered errors does not affect the
consistency property of instrumental variable estimators, their standard errors are not
efficient (given the instruments) and the usual diagnostic tests are affected. The efficient
GMM estimator has the smallest possible asymptotic variance when the optimal weight
matrix (W ) converges in the probability to the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix
of the errors.
Since all the students in the same school (Sm) interact with each other and have same
number of peers (NSm), the variance covariance matrix has a block diagonal structure
that takes into account the clustered structure of the data (Baum et al., 2003), which is
given by,
ΣCL =

Σ1
. . .
Σm
. . .
ΣM

(2.14)
where each submatrix Σm corresponds to the variance-covariance matrix between errors
associated to students in same school. That is, it measures the relation between students
in the same school. A natural estimator of each submatrix is calculated by crossing the
instrumental variable residuals of the schools. Hence,
Σ̂m =
∑
j∈Sm
u˜ju˜
′
j where u˜j = (yj − xjβ˜)X ′Z(Z ′Z)−1zj, (2.15)
where all elements have been defined above, except β˜ which indicates the coefficients of
model (2.4), estimated using the GIVE estimator defined in (2.13).
Last step: Consistent and efficient estimator for coefficients in model (2.4).
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Once instruments are selected and given the estimator for the variance-covariance
matrix of the errors (Σ̂CL), a consistent and efficient estimation of model (2.4) is obtained
by the IV-EFGMM estimator,
βˆIV−EFGMM = (X ′ZΣ̂−1CLZ
′X)−1X ′ZΣ̂−1CLZ
′Y. (2.16)
Since estimator (2.16) depends on the variance-covariance matrix obtained in the
second step and this last depends on the coefficients of interest, these last two steps can
be iterated until convergence is reached.
Endogeneity of the suspected explanatory variable can be tested using the C statistic
of (Baum et al., 2007) that generalizes the endogeneity test of Haussman to the context
of heteroskedasticity. The test is based on the difference between two Sargan-Hansen
statistics (Sargan, 1958; Hansen, 1982), where the suspected variable has been treated as
endogenous and exogenous respectively. Under the null hypothesis the regressor is con-
sidered exogenous. Hence, when the null is not rejected, coefficients are estimated by an
Efficient Feasible Generalized Method of Moments (EFGMM) estimator given by equa-
tion (2.16), assuming Z ≡ X, since there is no need for instruments. Besides, when the
null is rejected, coefficients are estimated by (2.16) to guarantee consistency. In this case
some validation tests are required in order to confirm the adequancy of the instruments
since they are the base of the estimation procedure (see Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004,
for more details).
Testing the relevance and exogeneity of instruments
Estimator (2.16) is consistent and efficient only if the instruments are both relevant
and exogenous. Firstly, instruments are considered relevant if they are correlated with the
explanatory variable considered endogenous. We propose to test the relevance of instru-
ments using the LM and Wald versions of the Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic (Kleibergen
and Paap, 2006), which are valid in the case of non i.i.d. errors. On the one hand, a
rejection of the null in the LM indicates that the equation is identified, i.e., the excluded
instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors. On the other hand, values
larger than 10 for Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic indicate that the instruments are
relevant and strong. Thus these two tests account for the first condition that instruments
have to satisfy.
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Secondly, the instruments are exogenous if they are not conditionally correlated with
the error term. Exogeneity tests, also called tests of overidentifying restrictions, require
more instruments than endogenous regressors (i.e. the equation is overidentified) and
assume that at least one instrument is exogenous (Wooldridge, 2006, 2010). Among the
main overidentification tests, the Hansen J statistic (Sargan, 1958; Hansen, 1982), also
known as the Sargan-Hansen statistic, is robust to heteroskedasticity. The null hypothesis
is that the instruments are exogenous and that the excluded instruments are correctly
excluded from the estimated equation. Rejection of the null means that the instruments
can not be considered as exogenous because they are conditionally correlated with the
error term. Consequently estimator (2.16) using those instruments is not consistent.
2.2.3 Inequality of opportunity measure
We now proceed to estimate the counterfactual distributions. According to Van de gaer
and Ramos (2015b), to guarantee that the inequality of opportunity measure M , as defined
in Equation (1.2) in Chapter 1, satisfies the compensation principle one should only use
yC,R = αˆR + βˆRC + γˆRE¯ + uˆ (2.17)
for fixed values of cleaned efforts (E¯). Note that the residuals uˆ are by construction
uncorrelated to the observed circumstances and efforts. Using the variance for measuring
inequality of opportunity, the corresponding measure of inequality of opportunity is found
to be:
M(y, C,E) = V (yC,R) = V (βˆR C) + V (uˆ). (2.18)
In the case of IV based estimation, the residual vector is orthogonal to the instrument
matrix (Z) but not to the data matrix of circumstances and efforts. In that case Equation
(2.18) should consider that the residuals might not be orthogonal to the data matrix.
Hence, the correlation between the residual vector and the circumstances matrix should
be accounted as follows,
M(y, C,E) = V (yC,R) = V (βˆR C) + V (uˆ) + 2cov(βˆR C, uˆ).
2.2.4 Decomposition of achievement inequality
The last point to discuss is how to measure the contributions of different sources to
achievement inequality. In particular, based on Equation (2.4), we use the predicted
39
educational achievement yˆi as a linearly decomposable measure,
yˆi = αˆ
R + βˆRCi + γˆ
REi. (2.19)
In order to measure the inequality in the predicted achievements which is attributable
to either circumstances or effort, we follow the natural decomposition of the variance
proposed by Shorrocks (1982). The author shows that the contribution of a specific
source is given by the covariance between that source and the outcome of interest. In
particular, since the vector of circumstances and that of efforts are uncorrelated, we get
the following expression,
V (yˆ) = cov(βˆRC, yˆ) + cov(γˆRE , yˆ)
= V (βˆRC) + V (γˆRE).
(2.20)
The contribution share of circumstances is given by the ratio of the variance of achieve-
ments predicted by circumstances, V (βˆRC), and the variance of the predicted achieve-
ment, V (yˆ). In a similar manner, the contribution share of efforts is given by the ratio
of the variance of achievements predicted by efforts, V (γˆRE) and the variance of the
predicted achievement, V (yˆ).
We are also interested in quantifying the contribution of certain circumstances to
overall inequality. To that end, we decompose the variance of achievements into that
related to each component,
V (βˆRC) =
kc∑
j
V (βˆRj C
j) +
kc∑
k 6=j
kc∑
j
cov(βˆRk C
k, βˆRj C
j), (2.21)
where Cj and Ck are the students’ column vectors of circumstances j and k from the
matrix of circumstances C = [C1, ..., Ckc ]. Then, according to the natural decomposition
of the variance, the contribution of each circumstance j can be obtained as,
S(Cj) = cov(βˆRj C
j, yˆ) = V (βˆRj C
j) +
kc∑
k 6=j
cov(βˆRk C
k, βˆRj C
j). (2.22)
Here the circumstance j is assigned the half value of all interaction terms involving that
variable in Equation (2.21) such that the sum of all the contributions over the kc variables
gives the aggregate inequality due to the circumstances. Finally, the partial shares of
inequality explained by each circumstance j is given by the ratio of the covariance in
Equation (2.22) to the variance of achievements, V (y). These partial shares are a simple
example of a Shapley decomposition.3
3There are other methods to measure the contribution of the explanatory variables based on their
contribution to an overall model fit statistic which are equivalent to Shapley values (see Gro¨mping, 2007,
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It should be noted that the estimates of the partial contributions rely on the validity of
the specific coefficients βˆRj . Thus, these contributions are valid only under the assumption
that βˆRj are unbiased. In practice, however, especially when instrumental variables based
estimators are used to account for endogeneity problems, there might be a sample bias.
Moreover, it is possible that certain circumstance variables may be correlated with some
omitted or unobserved circumstances. Therefore, given our model, we provide lower and
upper bounds for the contributions.
In order to compute an upper bound for the contribution of a circumstance or a set
of circumstances CJ , we run an auxiliary regression of y on the subset of circumstances
of interest,
yi = η + ϕC
J
i + ωi (2.23)
where the vector of coefficients ϕ captures the total effect of the subset of circumstances
CJ . That is, ϕ reflects not only the direct influence of CJ , but also any effect of these
circumstances through their effect on omitted variables. Then we use the upper 95%
confidence interval of the coefficients ϕˆU , to obtain the respective vector of fitted values
ϕˆUCJ , and compute its variance, denoted by V (ϕˆUCJ). This measure gives the overall
contribution of the subset of circumstances CJ on achievements, because both their direct
contribution, and their indirect contribution through the rest of omitted variables, are
captured. Finally, the upper bound of the contribution share is given by the ratio of
V (ϕˆUCJ) to the variance of achievements V (y).
A potential lower bound of the contribution of the subset of circumstances, CJ , is
just the achievement variance they explain, V (βˆRJ C
J), since it captures its ‘pure’ con-
tribution and disregards all the potential interaction effects. It would correspond to a
hypothetical distribution in which the only changes we consider are those that occur in
the circumstances of interest, while the rest remains unchanged. In particular we use the
for a discussion). One approach of that kind is the general dominance analysis of Budescu (1993), in which
the contribution of a variable is computed by aggregating results across multiple models. This method
requires that the ensemble of models contain each possible combination of the explanatory variables in
the full model (in a full model with kc independent variables, alterating between included versus excluded
variables, all possible combinations ensemble results in 2kc−1 estimated models). Then, the contribution
of a variable is derived as its weighted average incremental contribution to the overall fit statistic across
all models in which that variable is included. These statistics can be summed to obtain the value of the
full model’s fit statistic. Nevertheless, and as far as we are concerned, there has not yet been developed
any programme in Stata for estimating the ensemble of models with the IV-GMM estimator. As a
consequence, we opt for the natural decomposition of the variance so that we can estimate our model
with that estimator.
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lower 95% confidence intervals of the corresponding coefficients βˆR,LJ in the computations,
denoted by V (βˆR,LJ C
J). The lower bound of the contribution share is given by the ratio
of V (βˆR,LJ C
J) to the achievement variance V (y).
2.3 Results and discussion
In this section we check the endogeneity of the peer group variable as well as the validity
of our instruments. Next we analyze the total effects and marginal effects of circumstance
and effort variables, respectively. Then we evaluate the contribution of these sources to
achievement inequality, and finally, we assess inequality of opportunity.
2.3.1 Checking the endogeneity and validity of instruments
We begin by considering the results of the diagnostic tests associated with our results,
which are presented in columns 12 - 15 of Table 2.1. The p-values for C statistic in the
last column indicates that the average achievement of peers is endogenous in Belgium,
Croatia, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Romania,
Spain and Switzerland. Therefore, in these countries valid instruments are needed in order
to obtain consistent estimates. For the rest of the countries the peer group variable can
be considered exogenous and consequently the estimation of the models in these countries
is carried out by EFGMM.
In what follows we describe the selected instrumental variables and discuss their diag-
nostic results, which are available for those countries in which the IV-EFGMM estimator
is used.
The average achievement of peers is instrumented by different variables. The first is the
average occupational status of peers, which indicates their socio-economic status, and the
rest reflect the average effort of peers (orthogonalized with respect to the circumstances).
All of them are constructed based on Equations (2.11) and (2.12). The choice of this set
of instruments is motivated by the idea that a greater share of students with high socio-
economic status and high effort levels results in a better learning environment. Hence,
those variables are likely to be correlated with the average achievements of peers, as is
required for instruments to be relevant. To test this fact we use the results from the
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) statistics presented in columns 12 and 13 of Table 2.1. First,
42
the LM test, known as the underidentification test, indicates that the model is always
identified for the different countries. Second, the F statistic of the Wald test is at least
20, indicating that our instruments are relevant and strong for all the countries.
With regard to exogeneity, once the effect that students’ family background, school
characteristics and peer performance have on their achievements is controled for, their
schoolmates’ parental occupation and effort may not directly affect students’ individual
achievement. This is confirmed by the p-values for the Hansen J statistic of the overi-
dentification test, shown in column 14 of Table 2.1, in the sense that the null hypothesis
that the instruments are exogenous is not rejected. Therefore, all these tests show that
the instruments satisfy the conditions of relevance and exogeneity and, as a result, they
are valid.
2.3.2 Total and marginal effects of circumstance and effort vari-
ables
Columns 1 - 11 of Table 2.1 presents the total effects of circumstance variables obtained
by estimating linear regression model (2.4) by the EFGMM or IV-EFGMM estimators
discussed in Subsection 2.2.2, and also by using the first plausible value that represents the
mathematics achievement in PISA tests. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.4
The regression results in Table 2.1 point out that in general boys are expected to
obtain a higher achievement than girls, the exception being Iceland.5 Only in Finland,
Norway, and Sweden is gender not significant. In line with previous findings, our results
confirm that students with at least one parent born in the country have higher expected
scores than immigrant students in 75% of the countries. Note that in Bulgaria, Lithuania
and Romania, for which this variable is non-significant, less than 1% of students are
non-native.
The effects of the variables linked to socio-economic status are in general highly signif-
icant with a high positive impact on students’ achievements. As expected, the effects of
the highest occupational status of parents (HISEI) and the home ownership index (HPOS)
variables are positively significant for all countries, whereas the highest educational level
4For the estimations we use the Stata’s module ivreg2 provided by Baum et al. (2010).
5Schneeweis and Winter-Ebmer (2007) also found that boys are expected to perform better than girls
in maths whereas the opposite is true for reading. Similarly, Entorf and Lauk (2008) found significant
results for girls in reading.
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of parents (PARED) is significant for 75% of the countries.
By contrast, as has been found in the literature, school characteristics factors are in
general insignificant when family- and peers-related factors are taken into consideration.
In fact, in Croatia, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Romania, Spain
and Sweden none of these variables is significant to explain students’ outcomes. This
group includes Bulgaria, France and Portugal if we demand a significance level of 1%.6
Educational resources are positively related to scores only in Portugal. The effect of extra-
curricular activities is positive in Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and
Switzerland, whereas the effect is negative in the United Kingdom.7 The school climate
has a significant positive effect in the students’ scores only in Ireland and Norway, while
the effect is negative in France.8 Teachers’ morale is positively related to scores in Italy,
while negatively related in Switzerland. Finally, the number of qualified teachers positively
affects the performance of students in Belgium and the United Kingdom.
Regarding peer effects, the higher average achievement of peers affects students’ indi-
vidual performance significanly in all the countries. The largest effect is observed in The
Netherlands, Croatia, Italy and Germany, whilst the lowest is found in Finland, Spain,
Ireland and Iceland.
The results for the effort variables, once cleaned of the correlation with the circum-
stance variables, are presented in Table 2.2. These estimates are the same as the marginal
effects estimated in Equation (2.1) as mentioned before. As expected, when they are sig-
nificant the relation is generally positive. Specifically, in Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland,
Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom all
the selected effort variables are significant.9 In addition, the coefficients for perseverance
and not having repeated are significantly positive in all countries. The effect of the hours
that students devote to homework is significantly positive except for the Nordic countries
of Finland, Iceland and Sweden. In the latter two this effect is not statistically significant,
whereas it is strongly negative in Finland. In Finnish schools, there is notably less home-
6Ammermueller (2007), Entorf and Lauk (2008), among others, obtain similar conclusions.
7In the United Kingdom there is a high number of extra-curricular activities offered at school (indeed
the UK has the highest mean at 3.95) which are carried out by teachers from the schools and not by
external staff.
8The correlations between achievements and TCCLIM in France, as well as between achievements and
PARED in Croatia, Italy and The Netherlands are positive. Hence, the unexpected negative effects must
be due to the multicollinearity between these variables and other circumstances.
9Remember that in Norway students never repeat a year.
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work than in other countries because according to Finnish education ideology, pupils are
supposed to be taught in school, not at home. Therefore, one plausible explanation for
the negative association of homework time and mathematics achievement could be that
students who spend more time on homework are likely to be those who need to study
more because of poor performance. This result is consistent with Brookhart (1997) and
Liang (2010). Finally, in 65% of the countries, students who do not skip classes have
higher expected achievements. Similar result is found in students with a good attitude
accounting for 75% of the countries.
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Table 2.2: Estimation results for effort variables in Roemer’s framework
Country HWORK NSKIP PERSEV ATSC NREP
Belgium 1.841** 9.179** 11.58** 3.668** 56.97**
(0.219) (2.840) (0.988) (1.012) (1.987)
Bulgaria 2.660** 6.842** 5.883** 4.335** 44.86**
(0.255) (1.768) (1.019) (1.135) (8.324)
Croatia 1.626** 8.547** 5.764** -1.733 20.61**
(0.215) (2.345) (1.067) (1.078) (7.076)
Finland -1.466** 11.44** 38.13** 12.84** 85.60**
(0.491) (2.658) (1.484) (1.389) (4.601)
France 1.644** 3.313 21.18** 2.720* 32.64**
(0.318) (2.468) (1.276) (1.205) (4.667)
Germany 0.694* 6.758 21.05** -0.180 37.52**
(0.298) (3.986) (1.497) (1.130) (2.542)
Greece 2.815** -1.939 19.78** -2.058 46.56**
(0.247) (2.004) (1.324) (1.146) (7.787)
Iceland -0.646 14.33** 36.53** 16.24** 41.37*
(0.532) (5.016) (1.595) (1.603) (17.03)
Ireland 3.115** -2.826 21.08** 1.644 44.46**
(0.244) (3.365) (1.187) (1.169) (3.496)
Italy 1.332** 5.459** 11.31** 1.756** 32.14**
(0.0989) (1.093) (0.642) (0.614) (1.556)
Lithuania 1.804** 13.16** 9.733** 5.824** 66.87**
(0.254) (2.595) (1.689) (1.205) (8.620)
Luxembourg 2.766** 14.75** 10.30** 5.580** 58.97**
(0.386) (3.142) (1.262) (1.294) (3.873)
Netherlands 1.595** -4.253 4.659** 3.504* 27.63**
(0.217) (2.817) (1.053) (1.441) (2.360)
Norway 1.612** 24.00** 36.74** 9.689** :
(0.319) (3.276) (1.276) (1.389) :
Portugal 2.898** 3.267 15.41** 4.147** 80.36**
(0.330) (2.173) (1.180) (1.139) (3.171)
Romania 3.057** -0.0558 4.866** 1.710 17.10**
(0.202) (1.650) (0.832) (1.078) (6.501)
Spain 1.723** 8.843** 16.42** 3.874** 74.03**
(0.163) (1.446) (0.915) (0.815) (1.868)
Sweden -0.0394 17.34** 33.80** 8.969** 64.17**
(0.351) (2.863) (1.523) (1.436) (6.617)
Switzerland 1.852** 9.284** 17.37** 5.388** 45.99**
(0.314) (3.267) (1.260) (1.321) (2.662)
United Kingdom 4.382** 17.39** 22.50** 4.944** 56.11**
(0.330) (3.549) (1.329) (1.238) (5.821)
Significance levels:* 5%, ** 1%.
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2.3.3 Contribution of circumstances and efforts to achievement
inequality
Having estimated the coefficients of the educational equation for each country, we can now
calculate the contribution of the circumstance and effort related sources to the explained
inequality in educational achievements.
First of all, we analyze the contribution of the estimated vectors of circumstance and
the effort variables to the differences in the predicted achievements. Table 2.3 presents
these contributions. The second column in the table shows the percentage of the inequality
of educational achievements, as measured by the variance, which is jointly explained by
circumstances and efforts. The percentages are quite high. In fact more than 50% of the
variance is explained in The Netherlands (62.49%), France (62.33%), Belgium (62.12%),
Germany (58.67%), Italy (54.98%), Bulgaria (54.89%) and Portugal (52.66%). Only in
Iceland (29.09%) is the percentage of explained variance less than 30%.
Table 2.3: Contribution of circumstance and effort related sources to the explained
achievement inequality, V (yˆ)
Country R2 Correlation
Contributions (%)
Circumst. Efforts
Belgium 0.62 0.44 86.54 13.46
Bulgaria 0.55 0.43 93.02 6.98
Croatia 0.47 0.26 96.95 3.05
Finland 0.32 0.17 39.11 60.89
France 0.62 0.53 91.26 8.74
Germany 0.59 0.25 90.90 9.10
Greece 0.40 0.29 81.30 18.70
Iceland 0.29 0.18 44.37 55.63
Ireland 0.33 0.22 65.77 34.23
Italy 0.55 0.29 91.87 8.13
Lithuania 0.34 0.19 87.87 12.13
Luxembourg 0.48 0.35 76.05 23.95
Netherlands 0.68 0.33 96.45 3.55
Norway 0.35 0.08 43.77 56.23
Portugal 0.53 0.38 64.62 35.38
Romania 0.49 0.35 90.62 9.38
Spain 0.46 0.27 52.48 47.52
Sweden 0.34 0.12 55.38 44.62
Switzerland 0.48 0.21 85.53 14.47
United Kingdom 0.40 0.27 74.89 25.11
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Before looking at the contributions of the circumstances and cleaned efforts, it may be
interesting to analyze the correlation between them, shown in the third column of Table
2.3. Lowest values are observed for Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Lithuania with
the correlation coefficient lower than 0.2. Conversely, the highest values are observed in
France, Belgium and Bulgaria with the coefficient higher than 0.4.
The share of the education inequality explained by circumstances and cleaned effort are
presented in the fourth and the fifth columns respectively. These contributions have been
calculated by Equation (2.20). In addition, for illustrative purposes, the contribution share
of circumstances has been graphically displayed in Figure 2.1. As can be seen, more than
90% of the explained variance is due to the circumstance variables in Croatia (96.95%),
The Netherlands (96.45%), Bulgaria (93.02%), Italy (91.87%), France (91.26%), Germany
(90.90%) and Romania (90.62%). In all these countries the between-school variance is
relatively high. In contrast there is a group of countries in which the contribution of the
cleaned efforts to the explained variance is more than 44%. These countries are Finland
(60.89%), Norway (56.23%), Iceland (55.63%), Spain (47.52%) and Sweden (44.62%),
which correspond to those with the lowest between-school contribution values.
Figure 2.1: Contribution of circumstances to the explained achievement inequality
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Moreover, we are interested in analyzing which type of circumstance is the most in-
fluential in explaining the overall achievement inequality. In Table 2.4 the first column
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of each column block indicates the contribution shares of peer effects, family background
and parental occupational status (HISEI) measured based on Equation (2.22).10 This
information is graphically shown in Figure 2.2.
Table 2.4: Contribution of circumstance blocks to the achievement inequality, V (y)
Country
Contributions (%)
Peers Family HISEI
Lower
bound
Upper
bound
Lower
bound
Upper
bound
Lower
bound
Upper
bound
Belgium 43.35 35.10 50.00 10.16 2.56 33.94 5.65 1.31 21.05
Bulgaria 42.73 35.42 50.20 7.20 1.01 33.30 3.62 0.45 20.37
Croatia 41.08 35.88 43.48 4.81 0.68 23.18 4.35 0.77 17.83
Finland 1.71 0.48 4.76 10.57 6.93 15.89 4.82 2.36 8.80
France 45.63 37.40 53.03 10.66 2.34 38.49 3.64 0.45 20.48
Germany 44.29 37.27 50.14 6.89 0.96 30.20 3.50 0.39 20.37
Greece 22.07 16.18 28.95 8.66 2.05 24.92 5.11 1.21 16.30
Iceland 4.18 1.70 9.14 7.68 3.19 15.58 5.15 2.38 9.75
Ireland 7.75 2.79 16.39 11.18 5.13 21.76 6.06 2.36 13.48
Italy 42.61 38.09 48.81 3.42 0.74 15.02 2.21 0.40 10.17
Lithuania 22.51 17.69 27.32 7.16 1.89 20.27 4.13 1.04 12.58
Luxembourg 24.67 16.52 31.47 10.52 2.39 38.29 8.21 2.24 26.01
Netherlands 62.35 57.43 64.43 3.62 0.44 24.08 2.07 0.17 14.71
Norway 6.68 4.23 9.62 7.91 3.53 16.01 4.81 2.27 9.22
Portugal 15.31 7.90 28.11 15.62 6.70 33.40 8.08 2.57 22.38
Romania 34.18 27.01 42.21 8.69 2.27 29.79 6.01 1.50 21.88
Spain 7.15 3.32 16.63 14.34 8.57 23.35 5.53 1.95 13.64
Sweden 6.38 3.44 10.20 12.24 6.41 22.14 6.22 2.99 11.63
Switzerland 25.49 18.71 34.55 11.51 5.10 25.00 3.19 0.63 12.91
United Kingdom 20.20 14.75 26.29 8.47 2.93 21.35 5.17 1.76 13.81
The first column in the column blocks indicates the contribution defined in Equation (2.22) whereas the second
and the third columns indicate their respective lower and upper bounds.
As can be observed, in most countries peer performance is the greatest contributor to
the overall variance, explaining between 20% and 63% of achievement inequality. In fact,
the shares are higher than 40% for The Netherlands (62.35%), France (45.63%), Germany
(44.29%), Belgium (43.35%), Bulgaria (42.73%), Italy (42.61%) and Croatia (41.08%),
which are the countries with the largest shares of inequality explained by circumstances,
and with the largest between-school variances. However, this is not the case for the Nordic
countries of Finland, Sweden and Iceland, nor for Spain and Ireland, for which the family
10The contribution of school characteristics is not reported because it is lower than 1% for all the
countries.
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background is the most prominent circumstance, accounting for between 7% and 15% of
achievement inequality.11 Similar results are presented in Causa and Chapuis (2011) in
terms of the relative importance of the family with respect to peer-related background.
In Portugal and Norway the contributions of peers and family are almost equal. Among
the variables representing the family background, HISEI is the most significant for all
countries (except for Switzerland and France, for which NAT and HPOS are more impor-
tant, respectively). These contribution shares vary between 2.07% in The Netherlands to
8.21% in Luxembourg.12
Figure 2.2: Contribution of peer effects, family background and parental occupational
status to the achievement inequality
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Peers Family HISEI
To conclude with this part of the study, we look at the potential lower and upper
bounds of the contributions presented in the second and third columns in each column
block. Regarding the contributions of peer effects, both lower and upper bounds indi-
cate that the lowest shares are for the Nordic countries of Finland, Iceland, Sweden and
Norway, and for Spain and Ireland, whereas the highest shares are for The Netherlands,
France, Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy and Croatia. As for the contribution of family
background and HISEI, lower bounds are in line with the rankings of the contributions
11Keep in mind that these shares are computed with regard the overall variance V (y) rather than the
explained variance V (yˆ).
12The contribution shares presented in the first column of the column blocks in Table 2.4 are similar
to those obtained using the general dominance analysis of Budescu (1993).
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themselves. According to these rankings, the lowest values for family background are
found in Italy, The Netherlands and Croatia, while highest are found in Sweden, Spain
and Portugal. Regarding HISEI, the lowest shares are observed for The Netherlands and
Italy, whilst the highest are for Portugal and Sweden. On the contrary, upper bounds
provide different rankings. According to them, the lowest values for family background
are found for Italy and the Nordic countries of Iceland, Finland and Norway whereas the
highest are for France and Luxembourg. Regarding the upper bounds of HISEI, the lowest
contributions are observed also for Finland, Norway, Iceland and Italy, while Luxembourg
shows the highest.
2.3.4 Inequality of opportunity
Now we asses inequality of opportunity in the countries selected. To that end, we com-
pute the variance in the counterfactual distribution constructed according to Equation
(2.17). As explained above, these counterfactuals are characterized by three features:
First, correlation between circumstances and efforts is attributed to the side of circum-
stances; second, differences due to efforts have been removed; and finally the residual
term is included in the estimated achievement in order to guarantee that the compensa-
tion principle is satisfied. The results are displayed in the first column of Table 2.5 and in
Figure 2.3. As shown can be seen, there is a wide variation in inequality of opportunity
across countries ranging from 5734.45 in Finland to 9377.20 in Belgium. In particular,
Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, The Netherlands and Bulgaria have the highest
figures for inequality of opportunity, while Finland, Romania, Spain, Ireland, Norway,
Greece and Sweden have the lowest. These rankings are in line with those reported by
Ferreira and Gignoux (2014), where relatively lower levels of inequality of opportunity are
observed in the Nordic countries, Spain and Ireland, and the higher levels in the Western
countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland)
and Bulgaria.
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Table 2.5: Inequality of opportunity, total variance and share.
Country MD(Y,C,E)
Total
variance
Inequality of Opportunity
Share (%)
Belgium 9377.20 10244.42 91.53
Bulgaria 8101.55 8473.54 95.61
Croatia 7576.07 7698.89 98.40
Finland 5734.45 7093.42 80.84
France 8829.50 9337.97 94.55
Germany 8518.88 8999.19 94.66
Greece 6806.30 7342.72 92.69
Iceland 7237.50 8569.77 84.45
Ireland 6369.28 7122.10 89.43
Italy 7872.68 8224.06 95.73
Lithuania 7324.02 7641.03 95.85
Luxembourg 8054.90 9094.57 88.57
Netherlands 8195.17 8401.07 97.55
Norway 6448.08 8015.46 80.45
Portugal 7189.94 8742.41 82.24
Romania 6014.66 6298.59 95.49
Spain 6055.47 7616.66 79.50
Sweden 6916.50 8145.16 84.92
Switzerland 8353.26 8931.44 93.53
United Kingdom 8026.11 8923.94 89.94
Figure 2.3: Inequality of opportunity
0
2,
00
0
4,
00
0
6,
00
0
8,
00
0
10
,0
00
In
eq
ua
lity
 o
f o
pp
or
tu
nit
y (
va
ria
nc
e)
BE
L
FR
A
DE
U
CH
E
NL
D
BG
R
LU
X
GB
R IT
A
HR
V
LT
U IS
L
PR
T
SW
E
GR
C
NO
R
IR
L
ES
P
RO
U
FI
N
The second column gives the variance of the achievements and the third one presents
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the share of the total variance explained by inequality of opportunity. Regarding this
share, the highest percentages correspond to Croatia, The Netherlands, Lithuania, Italy,
Bulgaria and Romania, with more than 95% of total inequality captured by inequality of
opportunity. In contrast, in Spain, Portugal, and the Nordic countries of Norway, Finland,
Iceland and Sweden inequality of opportunity represents between 79% and 85% of overall
inequality.13
Figure 2.4: Overall inequality and inequality of opportunity
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Figure 2.4 illustrates the relationship between overall inequality and inequality of
opportunity. The regression line and a 95% confidence interval for the mean of the
achievements are shown. As expected, there is a positive correlation between the two
inequalities. The coefficient of correlation is estimated at 0.87. Romania, Finland, Spain,
Ireland, Greece and Norway are the countries with the highest levels of equality in terms
of both overall inequality and inequality of opportunity, while Belgium is at the opposite
end of the scale. We also find that Spain, Portugal and the Nordic countries of Finland,
Norway, Iceland and Sweden lie below the line, with lower-than-expected levels of in-
equality of opportunity, while Germany, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Italy, Lithuania and
Croatia are positioned above it.
13The reader should keep in mind that the levels of inequality of opportunity estimated in this paper
are upper-bounds of the real inequality of opportunity.
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A final issue of interest is to compare inequality of opportunity with mean educational
achievements. As can be observed in Figure 2.5, there is considerable variation across
countries and there seems to be no clear relationship between both measures. We find,
for instance, that Bulgaria and Switzerland have similar levels of inequality of opportunity
but extreme values of average achievements. Romania, with a low level of inequality, and
inequality of opportunity, is among the countries with the lowest mean scores. In contrast
Croatia and Bulgaria, which also have low scores, have high levels of inequality. We also
find differences in inequality levels among the countries with high mean scores. Switzer-
land, Germany, The Netherlands, and Belgium, all of which have high mean scores, have
relatively high inequality levels. Finland, however, has a low inequality of achievement
distribution, and is the best-positioned country.
Figure 2.5: Average achievements and inequality of opportunity
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Moreover, the relationship between inequality of opportunity and average achievement
could be used for deeper analysis. For instance, we find that the students in the least
privileged group14 in Switzerland, a country with a high level of inequality of opportunity
and a high average achievement, enjoy a higher education level than that of students
in Romania, a country with lower inequality of opportunity and also a lower average.
Furthermore, we find that students in Finland, which shows a low level of inequality
14Least and most privileged groups are defined as students located at the first and the last quartiles of
βˆRC, respectively.
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of opportunity and high achievement, do better than the most advantaged students in
Romania, also with low levels of inequality but low average achievement. On the contrary,
the more privileged students in Bulgaria, with high inequality of opportunity and low
average achievement, do worse than students in Switzerland, also with high inequality of
opportunity but high average achievement.
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we analyze educational achievement inequality in twenty European coun-
tries taking data from PISA 2012 using parametric procedures. For each country, we
first estimate a model, then measure the contributions of circumstances and efforts to
inequality in achievements, and finally assess inequality of opportunity.
Our model provides the total effects of the circumstances. Furthermore, we consider
for students’ peer effects as an additional circumstance, and due to the endogeneity of
this variable we use instrumental variables to obtain consistent estimates. These things
considered, the whole set of variables is able to explain more than 50% of the variation
for most countries, and in any case, this percentage is higher than 29%. Within these
shares, the contribution of circumstances is more than half for all the countries except for
the Nordic countries of Finland, Norway and Iceland.
Regarding the contribution of different circumstances to overall achievement inequal-
ity, peer effects are the most important circumstance for most countries. Indeed, for The
Netherlands, France, Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy and Croatia, peer performance
explains more than 40% of overall achievement inequality. On the contrary, for the Nordic
countries of Finland, Sweden and Iceland, and for Spain and Ireland, the contribution of
family background is notably larger than that of peer effects. As a matter of fact, in these
countries between-school variance is relatively lower compared to the rest. Among the as-
pects of students’ family background, parental occupational status is the most important
for almost all the countries. Additionally, we provide lower and upper bounds of these
contributions’ shares.
Concerning inequality of opportunity, the results show great disparities from one coun-
try to another. Achievement inequality is higher in Belgium, France, Luxembourg and
Germany and is lower in Romania, Finland, Ireland, Greece and Spain. In general, coun-
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tries with high inequality levels have greater inequality of opportunity, but there is no
evidence that inequality of opportunity is related to achievement levels.
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Chapter 3
Re-examining the inequality of
opportunity measurement following
a non-parametric approach
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter measures inequality of opportunity following the ex-ante and ex-post non-
parametric approaches developed by Checchi and Peragine (2010). In the ex-ante ap-
proach the population is partitioned into types, each of which consists of students who
share homogeneous circumstances. In the ex-post approach the population is partitioned
into tranches composed by students who share homogeneous efforts. Inequality of oppor-
tunity is measured either as the inequality between the types or as the inequality within
the tranches.
The definition of types and tranches is at the core of the measurement. In the usual
procedures researchers are normally forced to work with limited numbers of categorical
variables (see for instance, Checchi and Peragine, 2010; Gamboa and Waltenberg, 2012;
Salehi-Isfahani et al., 2014), or with a single continuous one (as in O’Neill et al., 2000).
This study seeks to provide another approach to define types and tranches that allows us
to consider any number of both categorical and continuous variables.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the procedure
followed in order to construct counterfactual distributions to measure inequality of op-
portunity using a non-parametric approach. Section 3.3 offers a review of the literature
on the most commonly used methods to define types and tranches, and proposes a new
procedure for their empirical definition. Section 3.4 presents the results and Section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 Framework for the inequality of opportunity and
its measurement from a non parametric approach
This section introduces the non-parametric procedure used to build up counterfactual
distributions in order to assess the inequality of opportunity in a given population.
Assuming that the educational achievements are completely determined by circum-
stances and efforts, as previously stated in Equation (1.1),
Yi = G(Ci,Ei) i = 1, . . . ,N G : RKC × RKE → R++,
the population can be grouped according to either circumstances or efforts. As regards
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the former partition, students that share homogeneous circumstances are grouped into n
types that are mutually exclusive. Accordingly, the overall outcome distribution can be
rewritten as,
Y = {Y 1., · · · , Y k., · · · , Y n.}, (3.1)
where Y k. = {yk.1 , · · · , yk.i , · · · , yk.Nk} is the achievement distribution of the students in type
k and Nk is the number of students in that type.
Regarding the partition in terms of efforts, students that share homogeneous efforts are
grouped into m mutually exclusive tranches. Hence, the overall achievement distribution
can also be rewritten as,
Y = {Y .1, · · · , Y .l, · · · , Y .m}, (3.2)
where Y .l = {y.l1 , · · · , y.li , · · · , y.lN l} is the achievement distribution of the students in
tranche l and N l is the number of students in that tranche.
Students that share homogeneous circumstances and efforts belongs to the same cell,
thus, the outcome distribution can also be rewritten in terms of these cells as,
Y = {Y 11, · · · , Y kl, · · · , Y nm}, (3.3)
where Y kl = {ykl1 , · · · , ykli , · · · , yklN lk} is the achievement distribution of the students in
type k and tranche l and N lk is the number of students in cell kl.
Table 3.1 represents the distribution of outcome Y where each column of the matrix
corresponds to a type and each row to a tranche.
Table 3.1: Achievement distribution in terms of cells
c = 1 · · · c = k · · · c = n
e = 1 Y 11 · · · Y k1 · · · Y n1
...
...
...
...
e = l Y 1l · · · Y kl · · · Y nl
...
...
...
...
e = m Y 1m · · · Y km · · · Y nm
In the studies with categorical circumstance variables (see for instance, Checchi and
Peragine, 2010; Ferreira and Gignoux, 2011; Gamboa and Waltenberg, 2012) and categor-
ical effort variables (such as, Li Donni et al., 2014), the number of types (n) and tranches
(m) are determined by the number of values that each variable can take. However, in this
study types and tranches are defined according to the variables that are categorical as
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well as continuous, and both n and m are determined exogenously. This will be explained
in Section 3.3.2.
Checchi and Peragine (2010) propose two distinct measures of inequality of opportu-
nity that are obtained through the ex-ante and ex-post approaches. Both of them are
explained in the paragraphs that follow.
Ex-ante approach
The ex-ante approach described in Checchi and Peragine (2010) relies on Van de
gaer’s formal definition of equal opportunity policy (Van de gaer, 1993) and is compatible
with the reward principle. After partitioning the population into n types, the value of an
individual’s opportunity set is measured by the average achievement of their type.1 Hence,
inequality of opportunity is measured as the inequality between the values of opportunity
sets.
The counterfactual in the ex-ante approach is given by the smoothed distribution in
which each individual achievement in type k, yk.i , is replaced by the mean of their type,
Y¯ k.,
YEA = {Y¯ 1.1N1 , ..., Y¯ k.1Nk , ..., Y¯ n.1Nn} (3.4)
where 1Nk is the unit vector of length Nk. Only inequality between types, which is due to
circumstances, remains in the given distribution. Then, a direct measure MD(Y,C,E),
evaluates inequality of opportunity as follows:
MD(Y,C,E) = I(YEA), (3.5)
where I is a standard inequality measure. As stated in Van de gaer and Ramos (2015b), if
there is a Pigou-Dalton transfer between two students in the same type, the counterfactual
defined in (3.4) is unchanged, thus, the measure of inequality of opportunity (3.5) satisfies
the reward principle.
Ex-post approach
The ex-post approach described in Checchi and Peragine (2010) is in line with Roe-
mer’s concept of equality of opportunity (Roemer, 1998) and is compatible with the
compensation principle. Once the population is partitioned into m tranches, inequality of
1Some other studies have proposed the use of distinct features of types’ outcome distributions. For
instance, Lefranc et al. (2009) relies on the stochastic dominance conditions of the outcome distributions
of types.
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opportunity depends on the achievement inequality amongst individuals within the same
tranche.
The counterfactual in the ex-post approach is obtained by replacing the achievements
of the students in tranche l, y.li , by the arithmetic mean achievement
2 of that tranche, Y¯ .l,
YEP = {Y¯ .11N1 , ..., Y¯ .l1N l , ..., Y¯ .m1Nm} (3.6)
where 1N l is the unit vector of length N
l. Counterfactual distribution (3.6) represents the
smoothed distribution in which students in tranche l are assigned the same achievement,
Y¯ .l, regardless of their circumstances. Hence, in counterfactual (3.6) there is no inequality
of opportunity. An indirect measure,MI(Y,C,E), evaluates inequality of opportunity as
the difference between the inequality in the actual distribution Y and the inequality in
the counterfactual distribution, YEP , as follows,
MI(Y,C,E) = I(Y )− I(YEP ). (3.7)
If there is a Pigou-Dalton transfer between two students in the same tranche, the in-
equality in the actual income distribution decreases whereas the counterfactual defined
in (3.6) is unchanged. Thus, the measure of inequality of opportunity (3.7) satisfies the
compensation principle (see Van de gaer and Ramos, 2015b).
The inequality measure I selected for this analysis is the variance due to the reasons
previously explained in Section 1.2 of Chapter 1.
Accordingly, equations (3.5) and (3.7) can respectively be reformulated as,
MD(Y,C,E) = V (YEA), (3.8)
MI(Y,C,E) = V (Y )− V (YEP ). (3.9)
Since the variance can be decomposed into population subgroups as the sum of between-
group and within-group components, the expression in Equation (3.8) is equivalent to the
between-type component of overall inequality. In a similar way, the expression in Equa-
tion (3.9) is equivalent to within-tranches inequality, that is, a weighted average of the
variance in each tranche where the weights are the population shares.
2Any other “representative achievement” such as the geometric or harmonic mean or the equally
distributed equivalent achievement could be formulated as well. Nevertheless, we follow Checchi and
Peragine (2010) who use the arithmetic mean in order to preserve the same total achievement.
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3.3 Empirical definition of types and tranches
The definition of types and tranches is at the heart of the measures of inequality of
opportunity in non-parametric approaches. Nonetheless, no consensus has been reached
so as to provide an unanimous criterion for their construction in a given sample. This
section first describes the most common procedures used to build up types and tranches,
and then we propose another approach.
3.3.1 Literature review
With regard to types, they have usually been determined by the number of values that
each circumstance variable can take.
The main disadvantage here is that as the vector of the observed circumstances and
the number of categories within each variable increase, the number of types grows geomet-
rically. This fact leads to types with very few observations, with large sampling variances
and unreliably imprecise estimates. This is particularly problematic in the case of non-
parametric approaches to inequality of opportunity, as large datasets are required in order
to yield reliable estimates.3 A common approach used to avoid the vast variety of types
with very few observations has been to ignore a large number of circumstances, and to
provide ad hoc definitions of types based on a small number of categorical circumstances.
As a consequence, a large part of the variation in outcomes due to circumstances has been
erroneously attributed to efforts.
As a way out for such cases, Li Donni et al. (2015) propose an alternative to the
empirical definition of types. The authors propose an econometric strategy for identify-
ing social types based on estimation of latent class models, where the composition and
number of these types are endogenously determined by the model. Their empirical strat-
egy develops in three stages. First they identify the number of unobserved types in the
data. Second, they estimate the probability of each individual belonging to each type,
given their observed set of circumstances. Then, individuals are assigned to social types
according to the highest probability criterion. This technique makes possible the use of
a wide set of circumstances while maintaining a fixed number of social types, from which
each individual can be treated as a random draw. In the case of the continuous circum-
3This problem is carefully analyzed in Ferreira and Gignoux (2011).
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stance variables, they are first categorized in order to avoid numerical problems in the
computations. Therefore, continuous variables are first transformed so as to estimate the
probabilities.
There are also some procedures that allows us to use exclusively the continuous vari-
ables. For instance, the study of O’Neill et al. (2000) evaluates inequality of opportunity
in the context of intergenerational income mobility using a conditional Kernel density
estimator. It evaluates the impact of a father’s income (the only circumstance variable)
on his son’s income (the outcome of interest). The opportunity sets are estimated using
the conditional Kernel density of sons’ incomes on fathers’ incomes. Then, the authors
categorize the circumstance variable for illustration purposes. Specifically, they extract
those fathers who belong to percentiles 25, 50 and 75 of the fathers’ income distribution,
and illustrate how having “poor”, “average” or “rich” fathers requires different amounts
of effort on the part of the sons to reach average income. The main shortcoming of the
model in O’Neill et al. (2000) is that only the income of the father is included as a circum-
stance, whereas the rest of the variation in income is attributed to effort. Consequently,
the term which represents the effort becomes unreliable for it comprises numerous rel-
evant circumstances that are left out in the analysis. Including additional variables in
the conditional Kernel density estimations is, however, hardly feasible due to the slow
convergence of non-parametric estimators.
In sum, many attempts have been made to tackle the issue of how to construct types
and tranches when a set of circumstance and effort variables is available, especially when
these variables are continuous.
Regarding tranches, their construction depends on the availability of effort variables.
In the studies where no effort variables are available, tranches are usually determined as
the quantiles of the type-specific outcome distributions under two assumptions: first, the
achievements are monotonically related to effort within a type, and second, the degrees of
effort are by definition orthogonal to circumstances. This method, inspired by Roemer’s
model (Roemer, 1998), is known as Roemer’s Identification Axiom.
When effort variables are at least partly observable, there are different procedures to
define tranches as is explained by Brunori (2016). For instance, if one or more categorical
variables are available (see for instance, Li Donni et al., 2014), tranches can be defined
as the number of all the possible combinations of values taken by each effort variable, in
66
the same way as in the definition of types. Nevertheless, this partition depends on the
effort which is likely to be affected by the circumstances and cannot be considered as
freely chosen effort. Therefore, this technique does not hold the orthogonality assumption
between effort and circumstances. If contrastingly, one continuous effort variable is avail-
able, then tranches can be defined as the quantiles of that effort distribution of types in
concordance with Roemer’s Identification Axiom. However, no more than one continuous
effort variables have been used in the contruction of tranches so far.
3.3.2 Empirical methodology to define types and tranches
Considering the limitations of the above mentioned methods, in this section we propose
a methodology in order to define types and tranches. Our proposal enables us to con-
sider any number of both categorical and continuous variables by using non-parametric
techniques. In the same way as O’Neill et al. (2000), our approach lets us work with
continuous variables, but instead of being focused on only one circumstance, we consider
multiple variables all together. This also makes it possible to use a wide set of circum-
stances while maintaining a fixed number of types, as in Li Donni et al. (2015), but we
do not need first to categorize the continuous variables.
The procedure consists of two steps, a parametric step to estimate the achievement
distributions conditional on observed circumstances and efforts, and a non-parametric
step to partition the population into types and tranches subject to students’ positions in
those distributions.
Parametric step: Estimation of the conditional achievement distribution.
To estimate students’ achievements as a function of circumstances and cleaned efforts,
we recall Equation (2.19) previously defined in Section 2.2.4 of Chapter 2,
yˆi = αˆ
R + βˆRCi + γˆ
REi,
Note that efforts Ei are orthogonal to circumstances Ci, so that the constant term αˆR
and coefficients βˆR comprise the common part between circumstances and efforts, i.e.
E(αˆR) = α + γφ and E(βˆR) = β + γδ. Thus, yˆi can be linearly decomposed into a part
that is exclusively conditional on circumstances, and another on orthogonalized efforts.
The former is defined as the first two summands of the right-hand side of Equation (2.19):
yˆci = αˆ
R + βˆRCi. (3.10)
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Therefore, yˆci indicates the achievement that student i is expected to reach given their
circumstances. Specifically, it aggregates the direct and indirect influence of the whole
set of circumstance variables.4
In a similar way, the achievement conditional on orthogonalized efforts is defined as
the last summand of the right-hand side of Equation (2.19):
yˆei = γˆ
REi. (3.11)
Thus, yˆei represents the achievement student i is expected to obtain conditional on their
efforts. This aggregates the direct influence of the set of efforts, which are cleaned of the
impact of circumstances.
We denote by Yˆ C = {yˆc1, · · · , yˆci , · · · , yˆcN} and Yˆ E = {yˆe1, · · · , yˆei , · · · , yˆeN} the respective
distributions of estimated achievements conditional either on circumstances or efforts,
respectively. These distributions represent the circumstances-related and effort-related
sources of inequality. Therefore, the population is fully characterized by (Yˆ , Yˆ C, Yˆ E).
In this context, we propose to define types and tranches as a combination of different
circumstances or efforts, in an analogous manner to the social types defined in Li Donni
et al. (2015). The idea is that the students that are close-equals in terms of Yˆ C should
be in the same type, whereas students that are close-equals in terms of Yˆ E should be
in the same tranche. In this way, these groups would be formed by students whose
achievements are homogeneously affected by their circumstances or efforts. Note that yˆei
is by construction orthogonal to the observed circumstances. Hence, it is not necessary
to partition the sample into types as a first step in defining the tranches.
Non-parametric step: Definition of types and tranches based on conditional
achievement distributions
To define types and tranches, first students are ordered from those that have the lowest
to those that have the highest values in the distribution of Yˆ C and Yˆ E , respectively. For
sake of simplicity, let x(1) ≤ · · · ≤ x(N) denote the corresponding order statistics of the
estimated achievement distribution conditional on circumstances, and that conditional on
efforts, where x = Yˆ C, Yˆ E . Then, we suggest partitioning the population according to the
quantiles of x into groups of students who have similar values of x = Yˆ C, Yˆ E .
4Note that even if the constant term αˆR were dismissed in Equation (3.10) the results on inequality
of opportunity would not change, since these are measured by the variance.
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The τth quantile associated to distribution F (x) is given by,
qτ = inf{x : F (x) ≥ τ} = F−1(τ), 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. (3.12)
The traditional estimator of qτ is the empirical quantile function estimator
q˜τ = inf{x : F˜ (x) ≥ τ} where F˜ (x) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
I(xi ≤ x),
with F˜ (x) being the empirical distribution function.
Nevertheless, q˜τ suffers a lack of efficiency (Azzalini, 1981) that comes from the vari-
ability of individual order statistics, especially in the case of continuous variables. A way
to improve this efficiency is to form a weighted average of the order statistics using a
smooth weighting function. Accordingly, in this study, the quantiles are estimated based
on smooth quantile estimator, provided by Yang (1985) and which is traced to Parzen
(1979):
qˆτ =
N∑
i=1
[ ∫ i
N
i−1
N
1
h
K
(
t− τ
h
)
dt
]
x(i), (3.13)
where K(·) is the kernel weight function and h is the bandwidth or smoothing parameter.
The role of h is to select the number of individuals to be taken into account in a type
(tranche) through the kernel weight, which gives the highest weight to the order statistics
x(i) for which
i
N
is the closest to τ .
In the empirical application we compute the non-parametric deciles from the univariate
distribution function of Yˆ C (Yˆ E) using the Gaussian kernel, and the bandwidth selection
method proposed by Li and Racine (2013) and Li et al. (2017) which has recently been
introduced in the R project’s np package by Hayfield et al. (2008). Thus, students that
are located in the τth decile of given distributions are assumed to belong to the τth type
(tranche), such that students in each type (tranche) are close-equals in the way their
achievements are influenced by circumstances (efforts).
3.4 Results
The first part of this section gives the descriptive statistics of types and tranches and the
second part presents the results on inequality of opportunity for each country.
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3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics of types and tranches
The types are defined according to the kernel smoothed deciles of the estimated achieve-
ment distribution conditional on circumstances Yˆ C obtained from Equation (3.10). Ac-
cordingly, each type is composed by students that are close-equals in terms of the overall
expected influence of the circumstances on the achievements. The parameters βˆR used for
the construction of Yˆ C are defined in Equation (2.19) and presented in Table 2.1 in Chap-
ter 2. In general, the estimations of these parameters are significantly positive, except
for some school background variables which are not statistically significant. Therefore,
the students with higher values in the selected circumstance variables, C, are likely to be
located in the types associated with higher deciles of the estimated circumstance variable,
Yˆ C, i.e. higher-order types, and vice versa. In essence, the lower-order types generally
present a higher share of non-native girls with lower average values for family background
and peer performance. On the contrary, the higher-order types exhibit a higher share of
native boys with higher average values for family background and peer performance.
As regards the tranches, they are defined according to the kernel smoothed deciles of
the proxy variables for efforts Yˆ E obtained from Equation (3.11). The coefficients γˆR on
which Yˆ E rely on are estimated from Equation (2.19). As can be seen in Table 2.2 in
Chapter 2, these coefficients are significantly positive.5 Thus, the students with higher
values in the orthogonalized efforts are located in the tranches associated with higher
deciles of Yˆ E and vice versa. As a result, in the tranches of higher order there is generally
a higher share of students that have never repeated, have not skipped classes, present
higher level of perseverance and attitude towards school, and spend more time doing
homework, whereas it is the opposite case for the tranches of lower order.
Individuals that share the same type and tranche belong to the same cell. The tables
for each country in Appendix I provide the means of expected achievements of the cells
together with their standard error, the number of observations, and the confidence inter-
vals for the mean. The values in the column that corresponds to type k ∈ n, and in the
row that corresponds to tranche l ∈ m represent the values for the students in cell k, l.
As can be seen, the higher-order types and tranches result in higher values for the means
of expected achievements than those of lower order. That is, the means are increasing in
5The only exception is the effect of studying time in Finland.
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circumstances and in efforts.6
The graphs in Appendix II provide a display of the information in the tables in Ap-
pendix I for each country. The graphs on the left display the information organized in
columns, such that each line represents the mean expected achievement of students in
the same type along different tranches. As can be observed, the slopes of the lines are
generally positive. This indicates that within each type the mean expected achievements
are increasing in efforts. Also, the lines associated to the higher-order types are placed
above the lines corresponding to the lower-order types, hence, the means are increasing
in circumstances as well. The vertical distance between the lines reflects the mean differ-
ences between students with homogeneous efforts located in different types. The greater
the distance between the lines, the greater the differences in average achievements due to
circumstances. At first sight, it seems that the largest differences are found in Belgium,
Bulgaria, France and Germany. In contrast, the smallest differences are observed in Fin-
land, Iceland and Norway. On the other hand, although the distance between the lines is
quite homogeneous in most countries, that corresponding to the first and the last types
are further apart from the rest, indicating a rather more different pattern.
The graphs on the right for each country in Appendix II depict the information or-
ganized in rows in the tables in Appendix I. Each line of the graphs describes the mean
expected achievement of students in the same tranche along different types. The positive
slopes in the graphs suggest that the mean achievements are increasing in circumstances
within each tranche. At first glance, the steepest slopes are observed in Belgium, Bulgaria,
France and Germany; this hints that differences due to circumstances within tranches are
likely to be greater in those countries. Additionaly, the lines that correspond to the upper-
order tranches are placed above those that correspond to the lower-order ones, such that
the mean achievements are increasing in efforts as well. Also, the distance between the
lines that correspond to the first and the last tranches are at a greater distance from
the rest. However, given the similar pattern and the small distance between some lines
associated either to types or tranches in some countries, it seems that the number of
these groups could be reduced. Future work may consider a procedure to test equality of
types and tranches in order to optimize the number of groups. This may be the case, for
6In the few cases where the mean is lower for a lower-order type or tranche, that difference is not
statistically significant according to the confidence intervals derived from Balance Repeated Replication
variance estimation.
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instance, for the Nordic countries of Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, and for Bul-
garia, Croatia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Romania,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
Regarding the within-cells standard deviation in the tables in Appendix I, the greatest
values are observed in the cells corresponding to the first and the tenth types and tranches
in all the countries. For instance, focusing on the cells corresponding to each type (the
information in column blocks), the variation is notably higher in the first and the tenth
tranches. In a similar way, in the cells corresponding to each tranche (the information in
rows), the largest variation is found between the students in the first and the last types.
To better understand what is happening within the types and tranches, we analyze
the Yˆ E distribution of types and Yˆ C distribution of tranches. Appendix III gives the
corresponding density functions that are estimated based on a kernel density estimator
which is given by,
fˆ(x) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
1
h
K
(
x− xi
h
)
x = Yˆ C, Yˆ E (3.14)
where K(·) is a kernel function with bandwidth h. K(·) places a greater weight on points
xi that are closer to x. In practice, among all possible kernel weightening functions, we
use the Epanechnicov kernel,
K(v) =

3
4
(1− v2), for |v| ≤ 1
0 otherwise.
We select the bandwidth h proposed by Silverman (1986) which is more robust against out-
liers in the sample, and it is formulated as h = 0.9AN−1/5, whereA = min(σx, IRQ/1.349)
and σx and IRQ are the standard deviation and the interquantile range of x, respectively.
As can be seen from the graphs on the left, the density functions are bimodal for all
types in Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Italy, The Netherlands
and Switzerland. Bimodal distributions usually indicate that there are two different pop-
ulation subgroups. These countries have the highest grade-repetition rate, and whereas
the first subgroup is mostly composed by students that have repeated a grade with a
lower mean for Yˆ E , the second group is mainly formed by those that have not, with a
higher mean for Yˆ E . For the rest of the countries, the Yˆ E distribution of types is generally
unimodal and they are reasonably homogeneous.
The graphs on the right in Appendix III display the density function of Yˆ C of tranches.
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On the whole, the tranches in different countries display different patterns of the distri-
butions of Yˆ C. In countries such as the Nordic countries of Finland, Iceland, Norway and
Sweden, and in Croatia, Ireland, Lithuania, Switzerland and the United Kingodm these
distributions are rather similar for the tranches. This indicates that the students’ circum-
stances are homogeneously distributed, regardless of how their expected achievements are
being affected by the orthogonalized efforts. Particularly, in the Nordic countries all the
Yˆ C distributions are somehow left-skewed, indicating higher probalities of having values
above the mean. On the other hand, in Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Portugal and
Spain, the students that exert relatively low and high values in Yˆ E (students in tranches
2 and 3, and tranches 9 and 10, respectively) are generally the ones whose achievements
conditional on circumstances are less favourably affected. Contrastingly, the students
with medium values of Yˆ E (those in tranches 5 and 6) appear to be those whose expected
achievements are most favourably affected by circumstances. It seems that, in general,
students with worse circumstances opt for exerting either low or high levels of effort, and
those with the best circumstances exert medium effort level. Interestingly, by looking at
the Yˆ C distribution of the first tranche we observe that students that exert the lowest
effort are equally distributed across types. For the rest of the countries we do not find any
clear association between the order of the tranches and the characteristics of the distribu-
tion. Nevertheless, a deeper analysis may provide some insights into which circumstance
or effort is the main determinant for classifying students into types or tranches.
3.4.2 Inequality of opportunity
Table 3.2 presents the results on inequality of opportunity in educational achievements
in the selected European countries. The first column presents the ex-ante measures and
the second column displays the ex-post ones.
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Table 3.2: Ex-ante and ex-post inequality of opportunity
Inequality of opportunity
Country Ex-ante % Ex-post %
Belgium 3146.66 30.72 2654.91 25.92
Bulgaria 2444.32 28.85 2648.57 31.26
Croatia 1530.99 19.89 1600.83 20.79
Finland 806.62 11.37 1067.93 15.06
France 2639.20 28.26 2381.48 25.50
Germany 2516.85 27.97 2368.34 26.32
Greece 1342.35 18.28 1470.41 20.03
Iceland 735.81 8.59 919.88 10.73
Ireland 1145.46 16.08 1246.91 17.51
Italy 1385.28 16.84 1436.52 17.47
Lithuania 1242.45 16.26 1383.64 18.11
Luxembourg 2235.48 24.58 1843.43 20.27
Netherlands 1892.45 22.53 1941.39 23.11
Norway 839.12 10.47 1047.99 13.07
Portugal 2155.19 24.65 1642.30 18.79
Romania 1516.63 24.08 1569.15 24.91
Spain 1403.10 18.42 1157.75 15.20
Sweden 1237.96 15.20 1421.72 17.45
Switzerland 1675.02 18.75 1667.98 18.68
United Kingdom 1581.79 17.73 1722.46 19.30
As shown in the table, although there is a wide variation in inequality of opportu-
nity across countries, there are not great differences between the ex-ante and ex-post
approaches. In both approaches, and in terms of both absolute values and percentages,
the countries with the lowest figures for inequality of opportunity are the Nordic countries
of Iceland, Finland and Norway, while those with the highest are the Western countries
of Belgium, France and Germany, and Bulgaria.
Figure 3.1 diplays the relationship between the ex-post and ex-ante measures of in-
equality of opportunity. As can be observed, these measures are positively correlated and
the countries stand close to the identity line. Most countries lie below the line meaning
that the ex-post values are higher than the ex-ante ones. The exceptions are Belgium,
France, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain, with higher values for the ex-ante
measure. It is worth noting that these countries are those that have a bimodal distribution
of Yˆ E .
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Figure 3.1: Relationship between ex-post and ex-ante measures of Inequality of opportu-
nity
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3.4.3 Comparison of the ex-post measures of inequality of op-
portunity obtained following the parametric and non-parametric
approaches
Figure 3.2 displays the relationship between the parametric and non-parametric measures
of inequality of opportunity that satisfy the compensation principle. The regression line
and the 95 % confidence interval for the mean is shown in the graph. As can be observed,
there is a positive correlation between both measures. Finland, Spain, Norway and Ireland
present relatively low values for both measures. Contrastingly, Belgium, Bulgaria, France
and Germany present the highest values. It is also observed that Iceland lies far below the
line with lower-than-expected values in the non-parametric approach. On the other hand,
Bulgaria and Romania stand notably above the line with higher-than-expected values in
the non-parametric approach.
It seems that when the residual is not attributed to the circumstances, Iceland is
the country with the lowest inequality of opportunity. However, that value increases
significantly when it so. This fact was expected since in Iceland the unexplained part
accounts for 70% of the achievement inequality, and so, the unfair inequality should rise
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Figure 3.2: Relationship between parametric and non-parametric ex-post measures of
Inequality of opportunity
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parametric approach
considerably when it is assigned to the circumstances. Contrastingly, Romania presents
an intermediate position when the residual is not accounted as a circumstance, but ranks
among the countries with the lowest inequality of opportunity when it is considered so.
This must be because the circumstances explain a relatively large share of the explained
inequality. Hence, inequality of opportunity is also larger when only this explained part is
accounted for. Contrastingly, inequality of opportunity in the parametric approach is in
line with the overall inequality, and since Romania is one of the countries with the lowest
overall inequality, the given measure is also relatively low.
3.5 Conclusions
In this study we propose an alternative method for defining types and tranches to con-
struct counterfactual distributions using a mix of parametric and non-parametric ap-
proach. By means of this methodology, types and tranches are composed by the students
whose achievements are being homogeneously conditioned by their circumstances or ef-
forts. In contrast to the existing methods, this one allows us to work with multiple
continuous variables all together. It also enables us to use a wide set of variables while
maintaining a fixed number of groups, but with no need to categorize the continuous
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variables first.
The results point out that the lowest values for inequality of opportunity are for
the Nordic countries of Iceland, Finland and Norway, while the highest figures are for
the Western countries of Belgium, France and Germany, and for Bulgaria. This is so
according to both ex-ante and ex-post measures. Although the results obtained in both
approaches are positively correlated, the rankings of the countries are different. In general,
the ex-post figures are higher than the ex-ante ones. The exceptions are Belgium, France,
Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain, with greater figures for the ex-ante measure.
These countries are the ones with a bimodal estimated effort distribution and the ones
with the largest grade retention rate.
Finally, we observe that there is a positive correlation between the parametric and non-
parametric measures of inequality of opportunity that satisfy the compensation principle.
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Chapter 4
Beyond cognitive-skills: the attitude
towards school and its determinants
in Spain
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(A summarized version of this chapter has been published, jointly with Mar´ıa Marta
Formichella and Natalia Kru¨ger in Revista de Educacio´n, 367, 10–35, 2015)
4.1 Introduction
Does school help students to prepare for adult life, giving confidence to make decisions
and teaching useful skills for a job? Or is it rather a waste of time? These ingredi-
ents of students’ attitudes towards school are influenced by their personal characteristics,
socioeconomic and cultural background of their family, and their centre’s disciplinary cli-
mate. The objective of this chapter is to analyze how the characteristics of students, their
families and schools influence their attitudes.
Attitude towards school encompasses students’ beliefs regarding the utility, enjoyment
and attachment to their school. Their perception of the usefulness of attending school may
indicate the predisposition of the students towards studying, their degree of responsibility,
valuing of knowledge and expectations regarding their future educational career.
Despite the significant role of the attitudes and other affective aspects of students,
they have usually been neglected in the economic literature. This is mainly due to the
difficulty in reaching an agreement on the definition of attitudinal characteristics that do
not belong to the dimension of cognitive skills. In addition, as Heckman and Rubinstein
(2001) and Levin (2012) stated, the lack of trustworthy methods available to measure
these characteristics has constituted another limitation for research.
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to make a contribution to the economic literature
on the importance of the affective characteristics of students. In particular we intend to
analyze the determinants of students’ attitude towards school in Spain. The working hy-
pothesis defends that the main determinants of this attitude towards school are individual
and family factors, whilst the influence of the schools is relatively minor. At the same
time it presumes that among the school variables, those related to the social-affective
environment have the largest influence on attitudes.
In order to test this hypothesis we take data from the 2009 wave of the OECD’s
Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) and we carry out the estimations
following a multivariate multilevel approach. This methodology attempts to capture the
hierarchical structure of educational data, and at the same time, to take into account
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the existing correlation between attitude—non-cognitive skills— and educational achieve-
ments — cognitive skills. Accordingly, a multilevel bivariate regression model is estimated
in which both attitude towards school and educational achievements are evaluated.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents an overview of the lines of
research on attitudes towards school. Section 4.3 gives details on the PISA 2009 dataset
and the variables we have used. Section 4.4 explains the multilevel and multivariate
multilevel approaches and presents the estimated models. Section 4.5 shows the empirical
results and Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
Attitudes towards school, and attitudes in a broader sense, have been long studied in
psychological and sociological research, but they have hardly been the focus of economic
studies until recent years.
Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) state that countless definitions of attitudes have been pro-
posed in the literature, but most researchers agree that a person’s attitude represents
their evaluation of somebody or something. Similarly, attitude towards an object reflects
the emotional predisposition to act in some way toward that object. Attitude towards
school, therefore, is related to the way students value the schooling and it may indicate
their perception of school as being interesting and important for their future (Davalos
et al., 1999). In addition, Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) show that attitude and behavior are
highly correlated, and this fact leads us to understand that students’ attitudes towards
school are likely to influence the overall pattern of how they respond to that school and
school-related activities.
The desire to conceptualize and examine parts of the literature under the label of atti-
tudes towards school presents some difficulties because there is a proliferation of definitions
and measures of concepts that are very similar and interrelated. In psychology, there is a
considerable amount of research on how students behave, feel, think and perform, which
leads us to harmonized conclusions, but they use slightly different concepts. In the para-
graphs that follow we introduce some studies that deal either directly or indirectly with
attitudes.
The main purpose of some studies is to make a contribution in the measurement of
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attitudes themselves. For instance, Thornburg (1980) provides a method to assess ado-
lescents’ attitudes by emphasizing the scaling techniques, reliability and validity. Valeski
and Stipek (2001) construct a measure known as Feelings About School (FAS) to as-
sess children’s perceptions of academic competence, their feelings about the teacher, and
their general attitudes toward school. McCoach and Siegle (2003) revise an instrument to
measure adolescents’ attitudes toward school, attitudes toward teachers, goal-valuation,
motivation, and general academic self-perceptions, which is known as The final School
Attitude Assessment Survey-Revised (SAAS-R). Hannula (2002) conceptualizes attitudes
towards mathematics using four different evaluative processes related to students’ emo-
tions, stimulation and expectations towards a situation. The study of Osborne et al.
(2003) reviews the attitudes towards science as a concept that includes students’ anxiety,
motivation, valuation and enjoyment of the topic. Fredricks et al. (2004) analyze the
multifaceted nature of school-engagement, and they analyze the attitudes towards school
as a portion of emotional engagement.
In all the mentioned studies, attitudes are not studied as an isolated process but as
a portion of a broader dimension where different emotional factors such as attitudes,
motivation and feelings, are dynamically interrelated. This broad dimension related to
students’ emotions and affection is better known as the non-cognitive dimension. The
concept ‘non-cognitive’ was introduced by sociologists Bowles and Gintis (1976) to focus
on factors other than those measured by cognitive assessments such as Intelligence Quo-
tient (IQ) tests, standardized achievement tests and school grades. These latter tests are
designed to evaluate cognitive processes, which are related to mental actions of acquiring
knowledge and understanding. Some examples of cognitive processes are memory, reason-
ing, problem solving, comprehension and use of language. However, the aforementioned
tests by themselves do not capture attitudes or, more generally, non-cognitive skills.
Heckman and Rubinstein (2001) point out that due to the lack of agreement on the defi-
nition and measurement of factors within the non-cognitive dimension, economic literature
has almost exclusively focused on measures of cognitive abilities, whilst the non-cognitive
dimension has been neglected until recently.
Nevertheless, there are an increasing number of measures of non-cognitive skills avail-
able, and correspondingly, there has been a growth in the number of studies that examine
their consequences on different outcomes. James Heckman, together with colleges, is the
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academic who has worked the most towards understanding of the role that non-cognitive
skills play in educational attainment, labour market success, health, and criminality,
among other outcomes. His studies have demonstrated that the predictive power of
non-cognitive skills exceeds that of cognitive ones (Kautz et al., 2014; Almlund et al.,
2011; Borghans et al., 2008). In addition, the authors show that both cognitive and
non-cognitive skills are correlated.
The influence of attitude towards school has been measured in many studies in a
quite different way. Despite the differences in the measurement, these studies coincide
in the conclusion that favourable attitudes impact positively on multiple outcomes. For
instance, Ames and Archer (1988) find that positive valuing of school has a significant role
in academic success. Ekstrom et al. (1986); Cairns and Cairns (1994) and Fredricks et al.
(2004) show that negative attitudes are associated with higher dropout rates. McCoach
and Siegle (2003) ascertain that negative attitudes towards school are associated with
educational underachievement. The relationship between attitude towards school and
educational achievements does not determine any flow of causality between these two
variables, but they are correlated (e.g. McCoach and Siegle, 2003) and this fact should be
taken into account. All in all, these studies emphasize the importance of boosting positive
attitudes towards school.
Non-cognitive skills, and hence attitudes, can be shaped by families, schools and social
environments, and furthermore, these skills are more malleable than cognitive skills at
later ages (Kautz et al., 2014). Therefore, it is essential to analyze the determinants that
boost students’ positive attitudes towards school. There are several studies in psychology
that examine how school characteristics influence the students’ attitudes towards their
place of study (Valeski and Stipek, 2001), but as far as we are concerned, there are not
many studies that analyze the influence of students’ personal and family characteristics.
In Spain, the empirical evidence indicates that the main determinants of cognitive
educational achievements are personal and family variables, while the influence of schools
is relatively minor. Similarly, the school variables that positively affect achievements are
those linked to the centre’s socio-economic and disciplinary environment (Ferrera et al.,
2013). Our study is interested in testing whether the same case applies in attitudes to-
wards school. The aim is to test whether individual characteristics and family background
are more influential than school background in boosting attitudes towards school. Simi-
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larly, we are interested in comparing the difference of the influence of these determinants
on attitudes towards school and educational achievements.
4.3 Dataset
As already mentioned in the previous section, the main interest of this chapter is, on
the one hand, to analyze whether the primary determinants of attitudes towards school
are individual and family factors (characteristics at student-level), rather than attributes
related to school (school-level); and on the other hand, to analyze the nature of the
most relevant attributes. In addition, the aim is to analyze how the influence of given
determinants varies between attitudes towards school and educational achievements.
With this purpose, we take data from the fourth round of PISA, conducted in 2009.
It provides information on students representing 15-year-old students from 65 participant
countries. During this round, Reading comprehension is studied in depth, keeping Math-
ematics and Science as supplementary.1. This chapter focuses on Spain and the final
dataset contains information about 18,043 students at 840 schools.
The dependent variables considered for the analysis are the index attitude towards
school (ATSCHL) and the average achievement in Reading, Science and Mathematics tests
(SCORE). The former stands for non-cognitive achievements of the students while the latter
embodies cognitive ones. Table 4.1 shows a brief description of each response variable.
The explanatory variables are selected on the basis of previous studies such as Bat-
tistich et al. (1995); Cervini (2003); Ferrera et al. (2013) and Opdenakker and Damme
(2000). For the purpose at hand, they are sorted into student-level variables and school-
level variables. The first type includes students’ personal and family characteristics and
they are described in Table 4.2; the latter type comprises school-related characteristics
and they are described in Table 4.3. Descriptive statistics of all the variables are presented
in Table 4.4.
Students’ personal characteristics include gender, age, immigration status, language
spoken at home and two variables that represent students’ prior academic career: at-
tendance at the pre-primary education and course repetition. Empirical literature shows
that the influence of gender varies according to the evaluated competency. Age is usually
1Further details on PISA are provided in Section 1.3 in Chapter 1
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Table 4.1: Description of dependent variables
Non-cognitive achievements: Attitude towards school index (ATSCHL)
An index variable that describes the perception of students
towards the usefulness and benefits of school. This index is
based on the opinion of students regarding: i) school prepa-
ration for adult life; ii) usefulness of school; iii) contribution
of school when making appropriate decisions; and iv) useful-
ness of school to find a job. These items are combined and
coded based on the Item Response Theory (IRT) scaling
procedure, and then standardized to scales with an OECD
average of 0 and a standard deviation of 1(OECD, 2012).
Cognitive achievements: Average achievement in Reading, Science and
Mathematics tests (SCORE)
This is the average of Reading, Science and Mathematics
standardized tests scores. It is calculated by taking the
average of the first plausible values in the three subjects,
PV1READ, PV1MATH and PV1SCI. Its role is to take into ac-
count the possible correlation between cognitive and non-
cognitive results when calculating the determinants of the
latter.
When the sample contains more than 6400 observations, there is no significant difference between employing only one
plausible value or all five, in the estimation of the mean and the standard error, or in the probability of committing a type
I error (OECD (2012)). Thus, we have chosen to average the PV1 values for all three competencies to calculate the SCORE
variable.
included as a control variable to take into account the calendar effect — the youngest
students within a school have more difficulties in the learning processes, as is stated by
Calero et al. (2009). Students with immigrant origin have on average lower achievements
in any cognitive competencies (see for instance Calero et al., 2010; Ferrera et al., 2013;
OECD, 2010). In this study 7.41% of students present an immigrant condition as can be
observed in Table 4.4.
Although Spanish is the official national language in Spain, there are other co-official
languages in specific regions. Therefore, there are regions in which the language of in-
struction is Spanish, but there are other regions in which it can be either the co-official
language, Spanish, or a mix of both. In addition there are students with a foreign mother
language. These facts are considered by including a variable that indicates whether the
language spoken at home coincides with the language used in the PISA test. All in all,
14.23% of the students did the tests in a language that was not the one spoken at home.
Various authors are in favor of including some indicators of students’ previous educa-
tional achievements, because ignoring them could bias the influence of contemporaneous
variables (e.g. Ewijk and Sleegers, 2010). Therefore, in our study, the early academic
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career is embodied with variables referring to pre-school attendance and grade repetition.
These variables intend to reflect both the academic path and the unobservable attributes
of family background that are likely to have an impact on the performance and the atti-
tude of students. Almost 95% of students received pre-school education for at least one
year. Considering grade repetition, it is a policy that is applied to the students that do
not reach certain academic level; 18.49% of students in the sample have repeated at least
one grade.
As regards the family related aspects, family structures that do not consist of two
parents might reflect the presence of a certain disruptive event in a student’s life, such as
a separation or divorce. Such experiences might affect negatively their attitude and the
learning process. 12.66% of students did not live with two parents at the moment of the
test.
The empirical literature emphasizes the influence of socio-economic and cultural fac-
tors in students’ performance (see for example Ferrera et al., 2013; Sirin, 2005). In our
study, the socioeconomic (SES) and cultural background of a student are presented using
PISA indices which are constructed combining students’ responses. Basically, the chosen
indices gather information on three dimensions: i) parents’ education, ii) parents’ occu-
pational status and iii) cultural climate at home. Parents’ education is defined according
to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) of 1997. This is a
scale index ranging from zero to six, with zero meaning no education and six referring to
second stage tertiary education (master’s degree and doctorate). PISA provides a vari-
able that shows the maximum ISCED level of either parent (HISCED) and based on it,
we create a new variable with three categories: i) primary education (base category in
the regressions; ISCED 0,1 or 2) ii) secondary education (ISCED 3 or 4) and iii) tertiary
education (ISCED 5 or 6). It is interesting to mention that more than 50% of parents
reached tertiary education level.
The occupational status of parents is shown with the index HISEI, and a categorical
variable related to the mothers’ employment status. Parental occupational status provides
information on the socioeconomic status of the family (Sirin, 2005). Parents in high-
status occupations might be an example for their children to follow, thus enhancing their
ambitions and attitudes towards school (Kohn, 1989). The values of this index range from
16 to 90, higher values representing higher socio-economic status. In Spain, the average
87
of the index is 48.06 mainly representing middle class families. Regarding the working
status, only the mother’s activity level is considered in the literature because, historically,
it has been the main agent of socialization and the transmission of education. As can be
seen only the 49.35% of mothers work full-time.
The cultural climate at home is embodied with the PISA constructed index CULTPOS.
Its aim is to capture family lifestyles and cultural resources which establish the intel-
lectual climate for children’s educational anspirations, and motivation and performance
in schools (see Nonoyama-Tarumi, 2008, and the references therein). The PISA index
CULTPOS is standardized so that the mean value of OECD countries is 0 and the standard
deviation is 1. Higher values of the index indicate higher possession of cultural items. The
Spanish mean for the same (0.27) is somewhat above the OECD mean. To finish with
family background aspects, households’ educational resources are considered indicating
their availability (HEDRES) and usage (HOMESCH). The former aims to reflect expenditure
decisions related to education at home, and the latter shows the effort parents and stu-
dents make to use these resources properly for education related tasks. The average values
of these indices (-0.01 HEDRES and -0.04 for HOMESCH) are very slightly below the average
for OECD countries.
School-level variables are related to the type of administration, resource availability,
and peers’ socioeconomic status and perception of disciplinary climate. As can be observed
in Table 4.4, 42.97% of the schools are private. School resources are symbolized with the
proportion of computers with access to the Internet (COMPWEB). In fact, having a greater
share of computers with access to the Internet might be an indicator of the availability
of financial and educational resources in the school. The average value of this variable
(0.98) is higher than the OECD average.
In the literature, the influence of peers’ socio-economic status is usually measured
by average background characteristics of peers (see for instance the survey provided by
Sacerdote, 2001). In this line, the peer-group contextual effects on students’ school perfor-
mance have been discussed widely. The meta-analysis of Ewijk and Sleegers (2010) shows
that students generally perform better in school if their own socio-economic background
is higher. To test whether this influence is also perceived in attitude towards school, we
include the school average of the Economic, Social and Cultural Status Cultural(ESCS)
PISA index. The country average of the same (-0.20) is lower than the OECD average.
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Table 4.2: Description of student-level explanatory variables
Student-level
Personal characteristics
Female Dummy variable equal to 1 if the student’s gender is female, 0 otherwise.
Age Discrete variable that ranges between 15.3 and 16.3. It is calculated as the difference
between the year and month of the test, and the year and month of the student’s
birth.
Native Dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one student’s parent is born in the country
of the test, 0 otherwise.
Language Dummy variable equal to 1 if the language at home is the same as the language of
assessment for that student, 0 otherwise.
Prior academic career
Preprimary Dummy variable equal to 1 if the student attended at least one year of pre-school
program, 0 otherwise.
Repeater Dummy variable equal to 1 if the student has repeated a grade at primary or
secondary school, 0 otherwise.
Family background
Family structure
Nuclear family Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household consists of a traditional two-parent
family, 0 otherwise.
Socio-economic and cultural background
Parents education
Secondary Dummy variable equal to 1 if the highest education level of either parent is high-
school graduate or the formative levels (ISCED 3 of 4), 0 otherwise.
Tertiary Dummy variable equal to 1 if the highest education level of either parent is at least
the first stage of tertiary education level (ISCED 5 or 6), 0 otherwise.
Mother full-time Dummy variable equal to 1 if the mother has a full-time job.
HISEI The index highest occupational level of parents corresponds to the higher ISEI
(International Socio-Economic Index of occupational status) score of either parent
or to the only available parent’s ISEI score.
CULTPOS The index of cultural possessions is based on students’ responses to whether they
have classic literature, books of poetry and works of art among other cultural items.
Availability and use of educational resources
HOMSCH The index of Employment of ICT in school tasks represents the frequency in the
use of information and communication technologies for studying.
HEDRES The index of home educational resources is derived from the students’ responses
to whether they have some educational resources at home including a desk and a
quiet place to study, and some educational material to help with school work.
All these variables are readily available in the PISA 2009 dataset. CULTPOS, HOMSCH and HEDRES are scale indices constructed
by combining categorical items from the context questionnaires using IRT modelling. These are transformed to scales with
an OECD average of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 (with equally weighted samples). It is possible to interpret these scores
by comparing them to the OECD mean (OECD, 2014).
Furthermore, we consider Lavy et al. (2012) who find positive associations between class-
room disciplinary environment, student-teacher relationships and students test scores.
Hence, we use two PISA indices that are related to students’ perceptions about their
relationships with the teachers (average DISCLIM) and the disciplinary climate in class
(average STUDREL) to analyze their influence in students’ attitudes. Whereas the aver-
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age value of the former is slightly above the OECD average, that of the latter is slightly
below.
Table 4.3: Description of school-level explanatory variables
School-level
Type of school administration
Private Dummy equal to 1 if the school is private (school managed directly or indirectly
by a non-government organization; e.g. a church, trade union, business, or other
private institution), 0 otherwise.
Resources availability
COMPWEB The index of computers connected to the Internet is defined as the proportion
of computers for educational purposes connected to the Internet at the school.
Socioeconomic and cultural composition
Average ESCS This reflects the social composition of the student population. We have calcu-
lated it by taking the school averages of the PISA index of Economic, Social
and Cultural Status (ESCS). This indicator summarizes the information about
the parents’ occupational status, their educational level, and home durables
(OECD, 2010). The greater the value, the higher the average socio-economic
status.
Climate
Average STUDREL The average of the index of a schools’ quality of student-teacher relationship.
We have calculated it by taking the school averages of the PISA index STUDREL.
This refers to the students’ average perception of the attitude and treatment
on the part of the teachers. The greater the value, the better the relationship
is perceived.
Average DISCLIM The average of the index of schools’ disciplinary climate in the classroom. We
have calculated it by taking the school averages of the PISA index DISCLIM.
This indicates the students’ perception of the order and organization existing
in the classroom during language lessons. The greater the value, the better the
perceived disciplinary climate.
We have constructed the Average ESCS, Average STUDREL and Average DISCLIM based on the variables ESCS, DISCLIM and
ESCS, which are readily available from the PISA 2009 database. These indices (ESCS, STUDREL and DISCLIM), as well as
COMPWEB, are constructed by combining categorical items from the context questionnaires using IRT modelling, and then
transformed to scales with an OECD average of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 (OECD, 2014).
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Table 4.4: Summary statistics for the variables
Variables Frequency (%) Mean Std. Dev.
Variables-level Response
ATSCHL 0.15 0.99
SCORE 508.55 77.37
Student-level
Student
Female 51.37
Age 15.82 0.28
Native 92.59
Language 85.77
Preprimary 94.77
Repeater 18.49
Family
Nuclear family 87.34
Parents’ education:
secondary 26.40
tertiary 52.12
Mother works full-time 49.35
HISEI 48.06 17.40
CULTPOS 0.27 0.84
HOMSCH −0.01 0.91
HEDRES −0.04 0.87
School-Level School
Private 42.97
COMPWEB 0.98 0.09
Average ESCS −0.20 0.56
Average STUDREL −0.03 0.33
Average DISCLIM 0.07 0.44
4.4 Methodology
This study follows a multivariate multilevel approach in order to analyze the determinants
of the ATSCHL of students while its interaction with the cognitive achievements is accounted
for. This approach is appropriate to deal with data that presents hierarchical structure,
as well as to take into account the interaction between multiple dependent variables in the
regression analysis. The paragraphs that follow, briefly introduce the multilevel approach
and then define the multivariate multilevel models of interest.
4.4.1 Multilevel models
The data provided by PISA is collected by means of a two-stage sampling procedure:
schools are selected first and then students within those schools are randomly sampled.
This sampling procedure is chosen in response to the hierarchical structure of the edu-
cational context where the students (student-level) are nested in schools (school-level).
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Therefore, there is one population in which the observation units are the schools, and
another in which the observations are the students; so each level corresponds to a popu-
lation.
Students selected with a two-stage or a random sampling procedure have different
chances of being selected. That is, a student within a school that has been selected —
via two-stage sampling — have more chances of being selected than a student that has
been selected randomly from the whole population — via random sampling. In addition
students attending the same school tend to be more similar than students in different
schools, among other reasons, because they share more resources and background char-
acteristics. Consequently, the assumption about the independence between observations
might not be satisfied when we handle data with clustered structure. The consequence
of using conventional regression analysis with such data is that standard errors of the
regression coefficients might be underestimated; this could lead us to conclude that some
effects are statistically significant when they are not. To obtain consistent and efficient
estimates of parameters, the data structure should be accounted for.2
The multilevel approach is one way of taking into account the hierarchical form of
the data because it allows us to estimate equations at each level. With this approach,
in addition to the unexplained variability between students, that between schools is also
regarded as random. This can be indicated by models with random coefficients. These are
appropiate if the schools are regarded as a sample from a population, and if the interest is
in drawing conclusions pertaining to the population rather than to the observed specific
schools (Snijders and Bosker, 1999). In this line, these models assume that unexplained
group variability is driven by a mechanism that is similar from one school to another, and
which operates independently between schools. That is, schools are exchangeable.
To analyze the data, first we define a student-level equation that defines the relation-
ships among student-level characteristics and the outcome of interest. Hence, we estimate
a regression equation for each school,
yij = β0j +
P∑
p=1
βpXpij +
Q∑
q=1
βqjZqij + eij (4.1)
for i = 1, ..., nj students in school j = 1, ..., J . Where,
2The previous chapters use the two-step Efficient Feasible Generalized Method of Moments in order
to obtain consistent and efficient estimates in the presence of non independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) errors.
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yij is the outcome of student i at school j,
β0j is the intercept or the average outcome of school j,
Xpij (p = 1, ...P ) represents the value of the p
th student-level variable for individual i at
school j,
βp is the regression coefficient that is common to all the schools,
Zqij (q = 1, ..., Q) represents the value of q
th student-level variable included with random
effects for individual i at school j,
βqj is the regression coefficient with a random part and it is allowed to vary across schools
according to that random part,
eij is the random deviation of student i from the average outcome of school j.
Then, we define school-level equations where the variability in the regression parame-
ters is a function of the characteristics of schools. Firstly, for each intercept β0j in equation
(4.1) we assume that,
β0j = β00 +
M∑
m=1
β0mSmj + r0j (4.2)
where,
Smj (m = 1, ...,M) indicates the value of the m
th school-level variable for school j,
β00 is the general mean for all the schools adjusted for S,
β0m are the regression coefficients that capture the effects of school-level variables on the
within-school intercept (β0j),
r0j is random error in the school-level equation.
Secondly, for the regression coefficients that belong to the variables included with
random effects, we pose the following equation,
βqj = βq0 + rqj (4.3)
where,
βq0 is the overall mean intercept on the within-school structural relationships (βqj),
rqj is the random error in this school-level equation.
Finally, we include Equations (4.2) and (4.3) in (4.1), so that we can observe how the
93
dependent variable can be decomposed as a sum of a fixed and a random part,
yij = β00 +
M∑
m=1
β0mSmj +
P∑
p=1
βpXpij +
Q∑
q=1
βq0Zqij︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fixed part
+ r0j +
Q∑
q=1
rqjZqij + eij︸ ︷︷ ︸
Random part
(4.4)
In this equation regression coefficients β00, β0m, βp and βq0 are not assumed to vary
across schools, they are fixed coefficients that belong to the fixed part of the equation,
because they are applied to all the schools. The errors or random effects in school-
level r0j — in the intercept — and rqj — in the slope — capture the between-school
variation. The latter components and the student-level error, eij, represent the random
part of the equation. It is assumed that r0j, rqj and eij have zero means given the values
of explanatory variables Xpij, Zqij and Smj.
3 It is also assumed that r0j and rqj are
independent from eij. These errors are normally distributed with their variances specified
as σ2r0 (indicating the variability in schools’ intercepts), σ
2
rq (indicating the variability in
schools’ slopes) and σ2e (indicating variability betwen students within schools).
4.4.2 Multivariate multilevel models
Multivariate multilevel models are the extention of multilevel regression models which
combine two or more outcome variables in one model. Snijders and Bosker (1999) provide
some reasons why it is sensible to analyze data jointly. First, it allows us to evaluate the
covariances between the outcome variables and to decompose them over the student- and
school-levels. Furthermore, the tests of specific effects for a single dependent variable are
more powerful in multivariate analysis, which is reflected in the consistency and reduction
of the standard errors. This fact is more considerable if the outcome variables are strongly
correlated. In addition, it is possible to test whether the effect of an explanatory variable
on one outcome variable is larger than its effect on the other.
Dependent variables are included into a multilevel model by creating an additional
variables-level below the original student-level. Hence, after this adjustment, there are
three nesting levels: level 1 with dependent variables indexed by h, level 2 with students
i, and level 3 with schools j. Therefore, technically, level 1 exists exclusively to define
3This implies that random intercepts and slopes are uncorrelated with all explanatory variables.
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the multivariate structure (see for instance Snijders and Bosker, 1999; Hox et al., 2010).
Our model has two response variables ATSCHL (h = 1), and SCORE (h = 2). Both
dependent variables are included into a multilevel model using a dummy variable for each
of them, d1hij for ATSCHL and d2hij for SCORE. Thus, on the lowest level we have,
yhij = pi1ijd1hij + pi2ijd2hij (4.5)
for h = 1, 2, where,
yhij indicates the outcome h of student i at school j.
pi1ij and pi2ij refers to the student-level equations for h = 1 and h = 2 respectively.
The symbol pi is used so that we can continue employing β for student-level and
school-level regression coefficients.
d1hij takes a value of 1 if h = 1 and 0 if h = 2.
d2hij is defined as 1− d1hij.
The specification of the final model is carried out in the conventional form (e.g. Bryk
and Raudenbush, 1992; Hox et al., 2010). That is, we start with the null model (Model
0) which does not include any explanatory variables, in order to evaluate the variance
decomposition of the dependent variables between the proposed levels. Next, in Model 1,
all the student-level variables are incorporated as independent variables with fixed effects.
In this step, we assess the contribution of each individual-level explanatory variable and
we evaluate the changes which have occurred in both the first-level and second-level
variance terms compared to Model 0. In Model 2 we include variables at the school-level
and we analyze whether they explain between-school variation in the dependent variable.
Finally in Model 3 we incorporate new elements in the random part, allowing that the
slopes of certain variables vary across schools. In the paragraphs that follow each model
is explained in detail.
Model 0: Null model
This model is used to test whether there are any differences at the school-level in the
outcome variables, and confirms whether a multilevel approach is necessary. It also serves
as a benchmark to compare the residual variances with latter models in which we add
explanatory variables.
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So, we start with variables-level equation (4.5) to define the multilevel structure, and
then, the student-level equation is defined in order to estimate a separate equation for
each school,
pihij = βh0j + ehij (4.6)
for h = 1, 2 e1ij
e2ij
 ∼ N (0,Ωe) Ωe =
σ2e1
σe12 σ
2
e2
 , ∀i,∀j.
Next, the school-level equation is posed to allow the variation in the intercepts of
schools,
βh0j = βh00 + rh0j (4.7)r10j
r20j
 ∼ N (0,Ωr) Ωr =
σ2r1
σr12 σ
2
r2
 , ∀j.
Inserting equation (4.7) into equation (4.6), and this in turn into equation (4.5), we
obtain the composite equation,
yhij =βh00dhij + rh0jdhij + ehijdhij (4.8)
Model 1: Random intercepts model with student-level variables
Model 1 also starts by defining the equation in the variables-level, (4.5), and subse-
quently all the student-level variables, Xpij, are incorporated as independent variables
with fixed effects in student-level equation (4.6),
pihij = βh0j +
P∑
p=1
βhpXpij + ehij. (4.9)
The school-level equation is the same as equation (4.7). Finally, the composite equa-
tion in Model 1 is the following,
yhij = βh00dhij +
P∑
p=1
βhpdhijXpij + rh0jdhij + ehijdhij (4.10)
Model 2: random intercepts model with student-level and school-level vari-
ables
In this model, in addition to the student-level variables included in the previous model,
the school-level variables are included to test whether they explain between-school vari-
ation in the dependent variables. On the one hand, the variables-level and student-level
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equations are the same as (4.5) and (4.9), respectively. On the other hand, school char-
acteristics, Smj are included in the school-level equations,
βh0j = βh00 +
M∑
m=1
βh0mSmj + rh0j (4.11)
Combining the three equations —(4.5), (4.9) and (4.11) — the composite equation in
Model 2 is,
Yhij = βh00dhij +
M∑
m=1
βh0mdhijSmj +
P∑
p=1
βhpdhijXpij + rh0jdhij + ehijdhij (4.12)
Model 3: Random intercepts and slopes model
To conclude, in Model 3, random effects are included in the regression coefficients of
the student-level equations. The equations used to construct this model are the following.
The equation (4.5) to describe the multilevel structure,
yhij = pi1ijd1hij + pi2ijd2hij
Next, the student-level equation with the variables embodying students’ characteristics
with fixed effects, Xpij, and random effects, Zqij,
pihij = βh0j +
P∑
p=1
βhpXpij +
Q∑
q=1
βhqjZqij + ehij. (4.13)
Then, in school-level or between-school equations, there are two distinct equations,
the first to define the random intercept (equation 4.11),
βh0j = βh00 +
N∑
m=1
βh0mSmj + rh0j
and the second to define the random slopes,
βhqj = βhq0 + rhqj. (4.14)
Bringing these equations together, the composite equation in Model 3 is the following,
yhij = βh00dhij +
M∑
m=1
βh0mdhijSmj +
P∑
p=1
βhpdhijXpij +
Q∑
q=1
βhq0dhijZqij︸ ︷︷ ︸
Fixed part
+rh0jdhij +
Q∑
q=1
rhqjdhijZqij + ehijdhij︸ ︷︷ ︸
Random part
,
(4.15)
which is the multivariate generalization of equation (4.4).
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4.4.3 Additional information about multilevel models
This section presents additional calculations frequently used in multilevel approaches to
analyze the proportion of the variance explained by the clustered structure in the popula-
tion, as well as by the included explanatory variables at each level. In multilevel regression
analysis the unexplained variance is exposed at different levels, hence, first we present the
intraclass correlation formula used to compute the proportion of the school-level variance
compared to the total variance. Then, we present the formulas of a statistic analogous to
the R2 for multilevel models4 in order to calculate the proportion of variance explained
using the explanatory variables at the different levels (see Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).
Finally, to facilitate interpretation of the coefficients at different levels, we provide the
formula to derive standardized regression coefficients.
Intraclass correlation
The intraclass correlation coefficient, ρh, is computed using the variance components of
the null model. It provides the proportion of total variance attributable to the differences
between schools, or what is equivalent, it provides the percentage of the variance in the
outcomes that is due to the school membership. It is computed with the following formula,
ρh =
σ2rh
(σ2eh + σ
2
rh
)
, for h = 1, 2. (4.16)
In contrast, the proportion of the variance attributable to student-level characteristics
can be computed as 1− ρh.
Percentage of variance accounted for by variables over the null model
Multilevel analyses provide information about the unexplained variance at each level.
The models that add explanatory variables over the null model should have a smaller
residual variance, since their aim is to explain variation in the outcome. Likewise, models
that incorporate random effects in the intercept and slopes should also present smaller
residual variance. Accordingly, it is advisable to compare each model with respect to the
null model in order to analyze the decrease in the unexplained variance. In general, models
with the lowest residual variance fit better than models with higher residual variances.
The proportion of the variance that is explained over the null model is computed as
4In multilevel regression analyisis, the concept of explained variance has no unique definition as in the
single-level regression analysis, since the unexplained variation is expressed at different levels.
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follows:
Student-level 1− (ehij)model/(ehij)null model
School-level 1− (rh0j)model/(rh0j)null model
Total 1− (rh0j + ehij)model/(rh0j + ehij)null model
Standardization of regression coefficients
When the interest is in comparing the effects of different variables within one sample,
the regression coefficients are often standardized because that facilitates their interpreta-
tion.5 Since the value of the unstandardized regression coefficients depends on the choice
of units used to measure the explanatory variables, it is often difficult to say which of
these variables is the most important in determining the value of the outcome variable.
Alternatively, standardized coefficients ignore the explanatory variables’ scale of units.
Essentially, these coefficients refer to how many standard deviations an outcome variable
will change per standard deviation increase in the explanatory variable. They can be
derived from unstandardized coefficients using the following formula,
Standardized coeff. = unstandardized coeff.× S.D. explanatory variable
S.D. dependent variable
. (4.17)
4.5 Results
The software Stata 12 together with the computational program MLwiN is used for the es-
timation of the models by following Leckie and Charlton (2013) and Rasbash et al. (2015).
Accordingly, the coefficients that accompany the explanatory variables and the variance
components are estimated simultaneously through iterative methods that maximize the
function of maximum likelihood. The observations are weighted by the standardized final
weights per student (W FSTUWT) as well as per school (W FSCHWT), provided by the PISA
dataset. These weights attempt to compensate the possible biases arising from the sam-
pling methods or from the non-response on the part of the school and students, and their
use enables us to derive appropriate estimations of population values.
5If the focus is on comparing parameter estimates from different samples to each other (as it is the
case in Chapters 2 and 3), one should always use the unstandardized coefficients.
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Table 4.5 shows the decomposition of the variance in the null model which is calculated
using the formula of intraclass correlation (4.16). Only 7.76% of the total variance in
ATSCHL is attributable to the variation between schools. The remaining variation is due
to differences among students within schools. This fact is also verified for educational
achievements, since 20.41% of the variance in the SCORE is due to the variation at school
level. Indeed, it can be observed that the relative role that personal and family differences
play is greater in the case of the non-cognitive results studied here, which is coherent with
the conclusions of Cervini (2003) and Opdenakker and Damme (2000).
Table 4.5: Intraclass correlation and covariance
ATSCHL SCORE Covariance
(%) (%) Par. S.E.
ρh 7.76 20.58
1− ρh 92.24 79.42
σ2rh 0.075** 1227.296 **
σ2eh 0.8697** 4735.097 **
σr1r2 −0.130 0.458
σe1e2 4.759** 0.498
Significance level:* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Despite the relatively low variation between schools for ATSCHL, σ2r1 , it is statistically
significant at 0.05 level. In the same way, the between-schools residual variation for SCORE,
σ2r2 , is also significant at 0.05 level. Accordingly, it is convenient to use the multilevel
approach for the estimations.
Furthermore, although the covariance between the dependent variables, σr1r2 , is not
statistically significant at the school-level, it is at the student-level, σe1e2 , as is shown in
Table 4.5. This shows that the correlation between students’ attitudes towards school
and their achievement is larger within schools than between schools. Accordingly, the use
of a multivariate approach is pertinent, given that it takes into account the correlation
between dependent variables in the model. All in all, multivariate multilevel approaches
are appropriate with our data.
Table 4.6 presents the results of the estimated models. It starts with the null model,
and then explanatory variables are added gradually in an attempt to account for some of
the variation at both levels. Initially, these variables are incorporated with fixed effects,
first at student-level (Model 1) and then at school-level (Model 2). Finally, Model 3
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includes the same explanatory variables as Model 2 together with random effects for two
variables, HEDRES and HOMSCH. These family background variables are the ones related
to the availability and use of educational resources. Hence, by including random slopes,
we wish to know whether the influence of these resources varies between schools. That
is, we want to know whether the schools have different capacities for compensating for
the diffences that emerge from the availability and use of these resources at home. In
the following lines, we briefly introduce the principal findings in each model, and then we
focus more carefully on the results of Model 3.
The results of Model 1 indicate that among personal characteristics, being a girl is
positively associated with attitudes towards school, whereas on average, girls have worse
achievement scores. Doing the tests in the language that is spoken at home positively
affects both ATSCHL and SCORE. In the same manner, having attended two or more years
at pre-school level also influences both types of results positively. Meanwhile, having
repeated at least one grade significantly reduces not only the ATSCHL value but also the
SCORE. This can be reflected in the impact of repeating itself – an experience that could
lead to a loss of motivation and a feeling of failure or detachment by interrupting the
school career continuity and separating the student from their group of peers – or it
can be capturing the effect of personal and family variables that have an incidence on
academic performance and attitude at the same time.
Regarding family factors, results suggest that the parents’ occupational status is not
relevant for determining ATSCHL, but their education level is. However, the effect is not
the expected one: the parents’ higher education level decreases their children’s valuing
of school. On the contrary, the effect on performance is positive. Even though this
result deserves further investigation, the following hypothesis is posed: parents that have
not had access to higher education value more the fact that their children can study,
transferring to them such enthusiasm; at the same time, in comparison with the more
educated parents, they possess fewer competencies to help their children on their student
path. Also, it can be observed that having educational resources, as well as materials
and an appropriate place for studying, and having access to works of art or literature, are
positively associated with attitude towards school. It is probable that, to a great extent,
these factors are reflected in the family attitude – the role given to education at home,
and the effort parents make to guarantee that their children have the necessary resources,
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regardless of their income. These results coincide with those referred to in the SCORE,
with the exception that, in this case, the parents’ occupational status is significant. In
the same way, having computer resources to carry out school tasks has a positive incidence
on motivation as well as on academic results.
As regards family structure, we find that belonging to a two-parent family allows us
to expect greater valuing of school. Probably, this is due to the fact that the presence
of disruptive episodes in the dynamics of the family, such as a separation, may affect the
educational process and interest for the same. However, this variable is not significant in
order to explain performance.
Model 2 is extended by including school factors. The amount of material resources
and the socioeconomic profile of the group of peers do not seem to have a relevant impact
on the determination of a positive attitude towards school. On the contrary, the socioe-
conomic composition of a student population influences cognitive results significantly.
Students’ perception of their teachers’ attitude does have an incidence on the ATSCHL
index. Thus when, on average, students consider that their relationship with teachers
is positive, and that they worry about their learning and well-being, they value school
more. Lastly, it is worth pointing out that the type of school management does not
present a significant association with the students’ interest in school or with their academic
performance.
In Model 3 random effects are incorporated for two variables. For home educational
resources (HEDRES) the random effects are not statistically significant; however, they are
in the case of technological resources aimed at school tasks (HOMSCH). This means that the
use of ICT – or the family attitude towards education that it may be capturing — does
not have the same effect on student attitudes in all the centers, and thus, schools seem to
have a role as mediators, modifying the students’ initial situation to a certain extent.
If we compare the results between the models, the significance of the student-level and
school-level variables have not been generally altered (except for having a mother working
full-time in ATSCHL), and the effects of the variables are slightly reduced in the last model
with respect to the previous ones.
The successive inclusion of explanatory variables increases the explanatory power of
the models. Table 4.7 shows the gradual reduction of the residual variance of each model
with respect to the null model. Model 3 is the one that explains most of the residual
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variance in each dependent variable and at each level. Our explanatory variables are able
to explain 5.46 % of the variation of ATSCHL within the school and 49.33% of the variation
between schools. In total, 8.85% of the total inequalities in ATSCHL are explained over the
null model. According to SCORE, the residual variance is decreased by 28.77 % at student
level and 57.56% at school level. These results are consistent with the literature on the
topic (Cervini, 2003).
Table 4.7: Residual variance that is explained over the null model (%)
ATSCHL SCORE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Student-level 4.12 4.24 5.46 28.16 28.21 28.77
School-level 6.67 49.33 49.33 45.81 57.41 57.56
Total 4.32 7.72 8.85 31.79 34.22 34.69
In multilevel models the deviance indicates how well the model fits the data (Hox
et al., 2010). In general, models with a lower deviance fit better than models with a
higher deviance. Table 4.8 shows that Model 3 is the one with the lowest deviance6
among all the models presented, and thus, it is the one that fits the best.
Table 4.8: Deviance of the models
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Deviance 255 443 248 582 248 122 248 061
Taking into account that the last model is the one that explains most of the variation
in both dependent variables and also has the lowest deviance, we focus our attention on
the results obtained in this model.
The coefficients of the explanatory variables that are statistically significant to explain
the variation of ATSCHL are standardized to facilitate the interpretation when comparing
the effects of different variables. These coefficients, which are presented in Table 4.9,
indicate the number of standard deviations in which ATSCHL will change per standard
deviation increase in the explanatory variable.
It can be observed that among the individual variables, having repeated a school year
presents a greater impact on the attitude towards school, decreasing the ATSCHL index
6The difference in deviance has a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the difference
in the number of parameters that are estimated in the models. The differences in deviance between the
adjacent models are statistically significant at 99%.
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Table 4.9: Standardized coefficients with respect to ATSCHL
Variable Stand. coeff.
Female 1.355
Preprimary 1.334
Repeating student −1.459
Nuclear family 0.483
Par. educ. secondary −0.432
Par. educ. tertiary −0.831
HEDRES 0.954
CULTPOS 0.502
HOMESCH 0.753
Average STUDREL 1.633
value by 1.5 standard deviations (SD). Girls, on the other hand, are expected to have 1.35
SD higher attitude towards school. In the same way, having attended pre-school increases
the index by 1.33 SD, and belonging to a nuclear family by 0.5 SD. The effect of parents’
secondary and tertiary education is minor and negative.
Regarding the variables related to home resources, an increment of one SD of educa-
tional resources, cultural possessions, or employment of the ICT, is associated with an
increment of 0.9; 0.5 and 0.7 SD of the ATSCHL variable, respectively.
The only variable at school level that is statistically significant is the index that reflects
the average quality of the relationship between students and teachers: if it increases in
one SD, the attitude towards school improves in 1.6 SD.
4.6 Conclusions
To summarize, there are many psychological and sociological studies that analyze atti-
tudes towards school, and currently there are more available instruments for their measure-
ment. The studies presented in the literature review have shown that attitudes towards
school have a significant impact on many life outcomes, and hence, they are valuable in
themselves. In addition, empirical evidence points out that attitudes are still malleable
at adolescence. Given the importance and the relative flexibility of attitudes towards
school, it is essential to identify the factors that help improve them. However, there
is a substantial gap in the economic literature which analyzes the influence of personal
and family characteristics in addition to school-related characteristics in these attitudes.
Accordingly, this study is aimed at contributing to the economic literature on attitudes
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towards school.
The hypothesis has been that, in Spain, the variables that influence the most on
attitudes towards school correspond to both the individual and family levels and that,
among school variables, the most influential are linked to their socio-affective climate.
The evidence is in favor of the hypothesis. The results show that the greater pro-
portion of the variance of attitudes towards school is explained by the students’ personal
characteristics, such as gender and previous academic career, and by the family character-
istics such as family structure, parents’ education and possession of educational resources.
On the other hand, the only school-related variables that are statistically significant are
factors that refer to the atmosphere students breathe at school. Therefore, a better school
climate affects students’ attitude positively.
Among the statistically significant variables related to family background, we high-
light the role of those that indicate the possession of educational and cultural resources.
These variables would evince a double effect. On the one hand, it would seem that if stu-
dents have the necessary resources to carry out their educational activity, their attitude
towards school improves. On the other hand, the fact that a home has the educational
resources implies that in the expenditure decisions of such a home, the purchase of these
resources has been valued. This reflects the positive attitude of adults in the home towards
education, which may influence the students positively.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that nothing can be done by schools, since the
model also shows that the inclusion of random effects in the variable that reflects the
use of ICT for studying has been significant. Thus, the centers are likely to differ in
their capacity to compensate for the inequalities of origin. Given that some schools
have a better performance than others when equating initial differences, there is room
for seeking improvements in educational policies that attempt to match the results of
different institutions.
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Conclusions and further research
This thesis analyzes to what extent students’ educational outcomes are conditioned by
circumstances such as their family background, school characteristics and peer effects, us-
ing data provided by the OECD’s Program for International Student Assessment (PISA).
While being aware of the limitations of the PISA program, this has been a major resource
that provides information about education systems and allows us to make comparisons
between European countries.
Chapter 1, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 analyze the educational inequality of opportunity
for twenty European countries. At first glance, the data shows that from the total variance
in achievements, more than 95% is attributable to the within-country variance, and that
in the Nordic countries of Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, and in Ireland and Spain,
schools are more homogeneous than in the Western countries of The Netherlands, France,
Germany and Belgium, and in Bulgaria and Italy.
In order to better understand the sources of inequality, we select circumstances which
are intended to capture the factors beyond students’ control such as their families’ social
origin, the school- and teacher-background, as well as their peers’ characteristics. Finally,
efforts are proxied by aspects that seem to be within students’ control to some extent.
Although the effort proxies provided by PISA present many advantages, they rely on
self-reported information from students, and so, suffer from some limitations. Therefore,
in future research, it would be desirable to complement our work by including effort
variables as measured in Zamarro et al. (2016) and in the references therein. These
authors evaluate the effort students make in completing surveys and tests, by analyzing
the survey-taking and test-taking behaviours of students in the PISA datasets. Since PISA
tests and background questionnaires are low-stakes, the effort differences across students
are not due to individual incentives. Therefore, effort is defined by careless answering
patterns and item non-response within background questionnaires. In addition, effort is
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also defined as the rate of decline in the performance in the test as it progresses. Then the
authors bring together these measures and analyze the share of the observed differences
across countries that could be attributed to differences in students’ efforts.
In Chapter 2 we specify a linear regression model for achievements on circumstance and
effort variables. To address the potential endogeneity bias arising from the simultaneity
problem of peer effects, as well as the clustered structure of the data, we use an efficient IV-
GMM estimation procedure. Additionally, in line with Roemer’s definition of inequality
of opportunity (Roemer, 1998), our model provides the direct and indirect effects of
circumstances. The counterfactuals are built based on those estimates.
In broad strokes, as expected, having at least one parent born in the country, belonging
to a family with a higher socio-economic background, or to a school with a better peer
performance, all affect mathematical achievements positively. Regarding efforts, having
spent more time studying, not having skipped classes within a school day, having been
perseverant, having shown a positive attitude towards school or not having repeated a
grade, all also result in higher average achievements. The whole set of circumstances
and efforts can account for more than 50% of achievement inequality for the Western
countries of The Netherlands, France, Belgium and Germany, and also for Italy, Bulgaria
and Portugal. This share exceeds 29% for all the countries. Within these percentages,
the circumstances explain more than half of the variation for all the countries, except for
the Nordic countries of Finland, Norway and Iceland.
Furthermore, we find that among the circumstances, peer effects contribute the most
to overall achievement inequality. The exceptions are the Nordic countries of Finland,
Sweden and Iceland, and Spain and Ireland, for which the contribution of family back-
ground exceeds that of peer effects. As expected, in the latter countries the between-
school variance is lower than the within-school variance, whereas the opposite is true for
the countries with a higher contribution of peer effects. Among the variables represent-
ing family background, parental occupational status is the most significant for nearly all
countries. Finally, to deal with the consequences of potential omitted variables bias, we
provide potential lower and upper bounds of partial contributions of circumstances.
The inequality of opportunity is measured as the variance in the counterfactual dis-
tributions where first, the correlation between circumstances and efforts is treated as
circumstances, secondly, differences due to efforts have been removed, and finally the
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residual term is included. This measure satisfies the compensation principle. The results
show that Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, The Netherlands and Bulgaria have
the highest figures for inequality of opportunity, while Finland, Romania, Spain, Ireland,
Norway, Greece and Sweden show the lowest. In general, the countries with high inequal-
ity levels have greater figures of inequality of opportunity, but there is no evidence that
inequality of opportunity is related to achievement levels.
There are some natural extensions of our work which could be addressed in future
research. On the one hand, all the results presented in this chapter rely on the estimation
of the regression parameters. As in any empirical study, it might be that achievement
depends non-linearly on the considered variables, or other variables which have been
omitted from our model. An interesting task for future work would be to estimate non-
parametrically the respective model, without a linear assumption, as well as to explore
the likely magnitude of the potential biases in the estimation, as in Bourguignon et al.
(2007, 2013) using Monte-Carlo methods. In addition, it would be worthwhile to explore
the methods for measuring the relative importance of correlated regressors discussed in
Gro¨mping (2007) and Bi (2012) in order to measure the contribution of particular cir-
cumstance and effort variables. Furthermore, it could be of interest to estimate the model
by means of quantile regressions to calculate the effects of circumstances and efforts for
students in different positions on the conditional test score distribution.
Chapter 3 follows a combination of parametric and non-parametric approaches in
order to construct counterfactual distributions. The main aim is to propose the use of
a methodology that enables us to consider any number of categorical and continuous
variables when defining types and tranches. Specifically, each student is assigned to types
or tranches according to the kernel smoothed deciles on achievement distributions which
are conditional either on circumstances or on efforts. The idea is to group students that
are close-equals by how their achievements are conditioned by either of the above two
sources.
Our proposal enables us to mix both parametric and non-parametric approaches in
order to benefit from the advantages of each. That is, it allows us to maintain an ad-
equate number of observations, so as to enhance the accuracy of the estimations of the
achievement means in these groups. Furthermore, it lets us hold Roemer’s assumption
of orthogonality of circumstances and efforts while defining tranches based on more than
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one effort variable.
The analysis of descriptive statistics of cells indicates that the means of expected
educational achievements are increasing in circumstances and efforts. Also, it is observed
that there is a greater variation of expected achievements in the cells that correspond to
the first and last types and tranches in all the countries. Future research would be desirable
to understand the determinants of that greater within-cell variation. It would also be
interesting for future investigation to estimate the posterior probability of belonging to a
type and tranche, and to identify the main determining factors for sorting students into
these groups.
The results on ex-ante and ex-post inequality of opportunity indicate that the lowest
figures are for the Nordic countries of Iceland, Finland and Norway, whereas the highest
ones are for the Western countries of Belgium, France and Germany, and for Bulgaria.
Even though the results obtained in both approaches are positively correlated, the rank-
ings of the countries are different. In general, the ex-post values are larger than the
ex-ante ones, except for the countries with the highest grade-retention rate. Finally, we
observe that the parametric and non-parametric measures of inequality of opportunity
are positively correlated.
Notwithstanding the importance of comparing the results, the number of countries
selected for these chapters might be too large if a researcher is interested in accurately
analyzing inequality of opportunity. Since each country has a particular education system,
some important issues have not been taken into account in comparing the results across
countries.
Chapter 4 aims to contribute to the literature on the relevance of non-cognitive aspects.
Using data from PISA 2009, for Spain we analyze and compare the determinants of
students’ achievements, or cognitive outcome, as well as their attitudes towards school,
or non-cognitive outcome.
Our findings in Chapters 2 and 3 point to the fact that in Spain inequality in edu-
cational achievements is mainly due to the characteristics of students and their families,
and not that much due to the role of schools and peers. Therefore, Chapter 4 analyzes
whether these conclusions can be transferred into attitudes towards school.
To test this, we estimate a multivariate multilevel model, which enables us to consider
the hierarchical structure of educational data, and the interaction between attitudes and
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educational achievements.
The results reveal that the greatest proportion of the variation is explained by students’
personal and family characteristics. In addition, it follows that the only school-related
variable that is statistically significant for attitude towards school is that related to the
disciplinary climate. Indeed, unlike for educational achievements, the socio-economic
profile of peer groups does not seem to be important for determining students’ attitudes.
Nevertheless, the inclusion of random effects at school level reveals that schools are
likely to differ in their capacity to compensate for inequalities of origin. Therefore, there
still is some room for seeking improvements in education policies that attempt to equate
the results of different institutions.
With regards to future research, it may be worth analyzing the determinants of at-
titudes using more recent waves of PISA. Moreover, it would be desirable to extend the
analysis to other non-cognitive skills such as motivation, self-confidence, perseverance and
so on. It would also be worthwhile to analyze how these non-cognitive aspects affect other
life outcomes such as future educational and professional careers, and also self-satisfaction.
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Figure 1: Mean achievement of cells per tranches and types for Belgium
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Figure 2: Mean achievement of cells per tranches and types for Bulgaria
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Figure 3: Mean achievement of cells per tranches and types for Croatia
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Figure 4: Mean achievement of cells per tranches and types for Finland
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Figure 5: Mean achievement of cells per tranches and types for France
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Figure 6: Mean achievement of cells per tranches and types for Germany
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Figure 7: Mean achievement of cells per tranches and types for Greece
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
70
0
80
0
M
ea
n 
ac
hie
ve
m
en
t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Tranche
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5
Type 6 Type 7 Type 8 Type 9 Type 10
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
70
0
80
0
M
ea
n 
ac
hie
ve
m
en
t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Type
Tranche 1 Tranche 2 Tranche 3 Tranche 4 Tranche 5
Tranche 6 Tranche 7 Tranche 8 Tranche 9 Tranche 10
Figure 8: Mean achievement of cells per tranches and types for Iceland
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Figure 9: Mean achievement of cells per tranches and types for Ireland
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Figure 10: Mean achievement of cells per tranches and types for Italy
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Figure 11: Mean achievement of cells per tranches and types for Lithuania
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Figure 12: Mean achievement of cells per tranches and types for Luxembourg
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Figure 13: Mean achievement of cells per tranches and types for The Netherlands
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Figure 14: Mean achievement of cells per tranches and types for Norway
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
70
0
80
0
M
ea
n 
ac
hie
ve
m
en
t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Tranche
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5
Type 6 Type 7 Type 8 Type 9 Type 10
30
0
40
0
50
0
60
0
70
0
80
0
M
ea
n 
ac
hie
ve
m
en
t
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Type
Tranche 1 Tranche 2 Tranche 3 Tranche 4 Tranche 5
Tranche 6 Tranche 7 Tranche 8 Tranche 9 Tranche 10
Figure 15: Mean achievement of cells per tranches and types for Portugal
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Figure 16: Mean achievement of cells per tranches and types for Romania
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Figure 17: Mean achievement of cells per tranches and types for Spain
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Figure 18: Mean achievement of cells per tranches and types for Sweden
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Figure 19: Mean achievement of cells per tranches and types for Switzerland
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Figure 20: Mean achievement of cells per tranches and types for the United Kingdom
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Figure 1: Kernel densities for Yˆ E and Yˆ C for Belgium
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Figure 2: Kernel densities for Yˆ E and Yˆ C for Bulgaria
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Figure 3: Kernel densities for Yˆ E and Yˆ C for Croatia
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Figure 4: Kernel densities for Yˆ E and Yˆ C for Finland
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Figure 5: Kernel densities for Yˆ E and Yˆ C for France
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Figure 6: Kernel densities for Yˆ E and Yˆ C for Germany
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Figure 7: Kernel densities for Yˆ E and Yˆ C for Greece
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Figure 8: Kernel densities for Yˆ E and Yˆ C for Iceland
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Figure 9: Kernel densities for Yˆ E and Yˆ C for Ireland
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Figure 10: Kernel densities for Yˆ E and Yˆ C for Italy
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Figure 11: Kernel densities for Yˆ E and Yˆ C for Lithuania
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Figure 12: Kernel densities for Yˆ E and Yˆ C for Luxembourg
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Figure 13: Kernel densities for Yˆ E and Yˆ C for The Netherlands
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Figure 14: Kernel densities for Yˆ E and Yˆ C for Norway
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Figure 15: Kernel densities for Yˆ E and Yˆ C for Portugal
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Figure 16: Kernel densities for Yˆ E and Yˆ C for Romania
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Figure 17: Kernel densities for Yˆ E and Yˆ C for Spain
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Figure 18: Kernel densities for Yˆ E and Yˆ C for Sweden
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Figure 19: Kernel densities for Yˆ E and Yˆ C for Switzerland
0
.0
05
.0
1
.0
15
.0
2
De
ns
ity
-200 -100 0 100 200
Effort proxy
Type 1
Type 2
Type 3
Type 4
Type 5
Type 6
Type 7
Type 8
Type 9
Type 10
0
.0
02
.0
04
.0
06
.0
08
.0
1
De
ns
ity
350 400 450 500 550 600
Circumstances proxy
Tranche 1
Tranche 2
Tranche 3
Tranche 4
Tranche 5
Tranche 6
Tranche 7
Tranche 8
Tranche 9
Tranche 10
Figure 20: Kernel densities for Yˆ E and Yˆ C for the United Kingdom
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